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4ALBANIA’S EU INTEGRATION PROCESS1
1. Introduction
Albania’s EU integration process represents perhaps one of the most debated matters in the
national  public  and  political  discourse.  Being  considered  as  the  strongest  incentive  to  move
forward in the democratization process, the EU integration struggle and political actors’
performance therein has attracted the attention of civil society representatives, private sector,
as well as the public’s attention at large. Yet, almost 15 years after the first contractual
relationship with the European Union, Albania seems to be only half way from its strategic
goal – EU membership.  The democratization process,  and thus the EU integration efforts in
the past 15 years were described by the Freedom House Report “Nations in Transit” 2004 the
following way: “Albanian democratization brings to mind the legend of Sisyphus: It is
marked by periods of progress followed by serious setbacks that bring it repeatedly to the
starting point”.2
Following the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the entry
into force of the Interim Agreement (December 2006) Albania entered a new and more
advanced stage in its EU integration process. The successful transition towards the attainment
of the final goal requires therefore better capacities to respond to membership obligations and
certainly a more firm commitment to consolidate the governance system, democratic
institutions and economic performance. The experience of other countries which have
successfully fulfilled their ambition in 2004 (accession of the ten new members) and 2007
(Romania and Bulgaria), as well as the best practices of other more advanced Western-Balkan
countries (Croatia) should undoubtedly be considered by Albanian stakeholders that are
responsible for accelerating the EU integration process. In the meantime, however, a profound
reflection should also take place of past mistakes made by Albania and lessons to be learnt
from those. The opening of the SAA negotiations in 2003 after two consecutive failures as
1 The author would like to express gratitude to colleagues at the Institute for Democracy and Mediations for their
support and direct assistance. The findings on this chapter have been discussed with a number of experts,
officials and colleagues working in think tank institutions in Albania and beyond. The author is deeply grateful
to Mr. Arben Kashahu (Gen. Secretary of the Ministry of European Integration - MEI), Mr. Alfred Kellermann
and Mrs. Rayna Karcheva (foreign experts at MEI), Mr. Klementin Mile (Chief of Sector at MEI), Ms. Valbona
Kuko, Mr. Ditmir Bushati (Agenda Institute), Mr. Sotiraq Hroni and to many other representatives of Albanian
institutions for sharing their views, comments and valuable suggestions. Last but not least, the author wishes to
thank Ms. Anna Reich and Ms. Qendresa Rugova at CEU’s Center for EU Enlargement Studies (CEUENS) for
their continuous assistance during the research period, as well as CEUENS representatives for their comments on
the first draft of this paper.
2 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2004: Albania (Washington D.C.: Freedom House, 2004).
5well as the three-year long negotiations represent perhaps the most illustrative examples of the
need for such reflection on the mistakes made by the country.
This study does not intend to fill the gap caused by the lack of comprehensive analysis
about the 15-year EU integration process and neither does it pretend to outline all the possible
lessons  that  Albanian  stakeholders  must  learn  and  bear  in  mind  in  the  future.  This  study
focuses on some of the most essential components of Albania’s EU integration process –
experience and future prospects – and thereby increases the sensitivity on the entire process
(rather than concentrating only on the eventual accession date) and to generate continuous
debate and far-reaching analysis on this topic.
2. Governmental Organisations and Institutional Structure of EU-Relations
Sound administrative capacities to implement the EU legislation (Madrid criteria) constitute
one of the core criteria that a country has to fulfil in order to join the European Union. In its
“Guide to the Main Administrative Structures Required for Implementing the Acquis” (May
2005) the European Commission suggests that “a candidate country preparing for accession to
the EU must bring its institutions, management capacity and administrative and judicial
systems up to Union standards with a view to implementing the acquis effectively or, as the
case may be, being able to implement it effectively in good time before accession”.3
Nevertheless, the process of building and upgrading these capacities is a continuous one and
yet, decisive for progress into the various phases of the integration process. In order to enable
a  smooth  implementation  of  the  obligations  assumed  under  this  process,  the  potential
candidate country must, amongst others, develop a sound institutional framework involving
governmental structures with clear mechanisms for interaction and coordination. The
experience of other countries (those from the 2004 enlargement and the SAP countries)
reveals various institutional solutions for the main governmental body in charge of EU
integration matters, often depending on the current stage of their integration process. Usually,
a special ministerial portfolio has been assigned to follow and coordinate a country’s efforts
to join the Union, though other solutions have also been present – special secretariat under the
Prime Minister’s office (Macedonia) or within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Croatia).
In the last five years Albania has employed various approaches in the course of
designing its institutional setup of the European integration process. Albania’s choices have
3 European Commission, Guide to the Main Administrative Structures Required for Implementing the Acquis
(Brussels: European Commission, 2005), 7.
6mainly reflected its progress in the stabilisation and association process, and at times, also the
impact of internal political developments. The subsequent sections reveal the development of
governmental and other bodies involved in the European integration process.
2.1. Governmental Bodies Responsible for EU Relations
Albania’s efforts to join the European Union (EU) are presently coordinated by the Ministry
of European Integration (MEI) which was established in 2004.4 Point 1 of the 2004 decision
establishing the Ministry reads that “MEI’s mission involves technical management and
coordination of Albania’s EU integration process through approximation of legislation, design
of integration policies, coordination of financial assistance and informing the public about this
process”. While the Ministry of Integration leads and coordinates the work of other line
ministries  with  regard  to  EU  integration  matters,  it  also  has  to  coordinate  closely  with  the
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Albanian  diplomatic  mission  to  EU.  Furthermore,  the
coordination  with  the  other  line  ministries  is  currently  being  carried  out  through  the  special
Sections for EU Integration which have been established in all ministries.
The decision of the Albanian Government establishing a separate Ministry for EU
integration matters followed the opening of the negotiations with the European Commission
(EC) on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). The decision not only finalized
the efforts (which began in 2001) to reflect the new stage the country was entering in its EU
integration process, but it also brought under a single and direct institutional umbrella various
departments at governmental (Department for European Integration) and ministerial level
(such  as  the  Department  for  Approximation  of  Legislation  at  the  Ministry  of  Justice).5 The
strengthening of governmental structures dealing with the EU (State Minister and the
Department for European Integration) was continuously suggested by the EC during the Task
Force  Meetings  and  also  in  the  first  and  second  EC  progress  report.  Both  reports’
recommendation read the same: “The main European Integration structures and particularly
the Ministry of State for European Integration need further reinforcement.”6
4 Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 580, dated 10/09/2004.
5 Under the current organizational structure of the Ministry of European Integration, the work of the Department
for Approximation of Legislation (formerly under the Ministry of Justice) is covered by two Directorates:
Directorate of Justice and Home Affairs and the Directorate of Internal Market.
6 European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2002” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2002 163), 30; and European Commission, “Albania
Stabilization and Association Report 2003” Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels: European
Commission, COM 2003 139), 35.
7Prior to 2004, the Albanian Government had established a State Minister for
Integration and a special Department for European Integration in 2001 which would represent
the country in the bilateral negotiations with the EC and coordinate and monitor the EU
integration process soon to enter the phase of the SAA negotiations. Such step was imposed at
the  time  not  only  due  to  the  progress  in  the  integration  process  but  also  because  of  the
requirements that accompanied this progress such as the consolidation of the fragmented
institutional setup dealing with EU matters. Although these governmental structures (State
Minister for Integration and its Department for European Integration) were introduced only
one year before the EC’s first report and its recommendation for institutional improvements, it
was obvious that the introduction of the State Minister did not change the fragmented setup
significantly. The State Minister for European Integration was basically a simple substitute of
the State Secretary for European Integration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.7 The State
Secretary in fact was considered as part of the Council of Ministers since 1997. Yet, under the
Cabinet led by Mr. Bashkim Fino (National Reconciliation Government, 1997) the State
Secretary  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (MFA)  was  in  charge  of  not  only  EU but  also
NATO integration matters and was called the State Secretary for Euro-Atlantic Integration.8
Accordingly, since the separation of EU integration matters (State Secretary at MFA) and
NATO integration matters (State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence) back in 1998, the
establishment of the Ministry of European Integration (2004) that gathered all other
specialized structures in various ministries under its umbrella, was the second most essential
institutional change of the governmental setup on EU integration, although over this six year
period there were many changes in the governmental cabinets.9 As the table 3.1 shows, over a
ten year period (1997-2007) Albania has had 10 State Secretaries and Ministers in charge of
EU affairs, and during the period it has experimented with five possible institutional solutions
(including  the  return  to  the  pre-1997  scheme of  EU integration  matters  under  MFA’s  Euro-
Atlantic Integration Department during 1999 – 2001). From 2004 onwards not only the
composition of the governmental cabinet but also the EU related structures proved to be rather
stabile and this actually seemed to reflect the very progress of the Albanian SA process.
Table 3.1. State Secretaries and Ministers of European Integration, 1997-2007
7 Law No. 8327, dated 16/04/1998 “On Adjustments of the structure of the Council of Ministers”.
8 Presidential Decree No. 1742, dated 12/03/1997 on the new Cabinet of the Council of Ministers led by Mr.
Bashkim Fino.
9 Prior  to  1997,  relations  with  EU  and  EU  integration  matters  were  handled  by  a  special  Department  at  the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
8Period Name & Position
July 1997 - April 1998 Mr. Maqo Lakrori, State Secretary for Euro-Atlantic Integration
April - October 1998 Mr. Ilir Meta, State Secretary for European Integration
October 1998 -
October 1999
Mr. Maqo Lakrori, State Secretary for European Integration *
September 2001 –
February 2002
Mr. Paskal Milo, State Minister for European Integration *
February 2002 – July
2002
Mr. Marko Bello, State Minister for European Integration
July 2002 – July 2003 Mr. Sokol Nako State Minister for European Integration
July 2003 – December
2003
Mrs. Ermelinda Meksi, Deputy Prime Minister and State
Minister for European Integration
December 2003 –
September 2005
Mrs. Ermelinda Meksi, Minister of European Integration
September 2005 –
March 2007
Mrs. Arenca Trashani, Minister of European Integration
2007 – Present Mrs. Majlinda Bregu, Minister of European Integration
* In the period between 1999 and 2001 Albania reverted to the pre-1997 institutional solution when EU
integration matters were under the competencies of the Euro-Atlantic Integration Department at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
At present, the governmental structures dealing with the process of European Integration are
well-developed and they fully reflect the stage that the country has entered in its road towards
the EU.10 In  addition  to  the  Ministry  of  European  Integration  and  the  Council  of  Ministers
there are three governmental structures that facilitate the EU integration process. The Inter-
ministerial Committee for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Matters is responsible for
guiding and monitoring the entire integration process in Albania and in its periodical meetings
the Committee deals with the most important issues regarding the process of European
integration.11 Another important governmental structure is the Inter-ministerial Working
Group for the supervision and coordination of the implementation of commitments
10 Yet given the current progress and also future prospects, independent experts argue that the EU integration
process must occupy the agenda of the meetings of the Council of Ministers more often. EU funded experts in
the framework of the SMEI (Support to the Ministry of European Integration) project suggest that the meetings
of the Council of Ministers should involve discussions on specific issues related to EU integration process at
least twice a month.
11 Council of Ministers Decision No. 753, dated 01/12/1998.
9undertaken in the framework of the SAA12. This body is headed by the Minister of Integration
and it involves also the Minister of Finance (Co- Chairman), representatives from the line
ministries (Deputy Minister or General Secretary), and officials of the central institutions
depending from the Council of Ministers. The main duties of this body are related to the SAA
which involve: directing, analysing, supervising and coordinating the work for the
implementation undertaken by Albania in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement, the Interim Agreement, the European Partnership, and priorities and
recommendations of strategic documents of European integration process.13
The  Ministry  of  European  Integration  (MEI),  as  it  has  been  pointed  out,  was
established  not  only  as  a  reflection  of  the  EU  integration  process’  progress  in  2004  (SAA
negotiations), but also to address the need for better institutional capacities and an improved
coordination of the process. The Ministry of European Integration represents the official
positions of Albania in the high level EU – Albania meetings.14 Some of the core
competencies and functions of the Ministry of Integration involve:
? the coordination and monitoring of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP);
? coordination and monitoring of the process of addressing the SAP objectives and
obligations;
? coordination, monitoring and implementation of the process of approximation with EU
acquis communautaire;
? representation of the country in the joint EU-Albania consultative meetings;
? monitoring of the work and performance of various working groups (inter-ministerial)
in the framework of the SAP;
? negotiation, programming, coordination and monitoring of the implementation of EU
assistance (under CARDS15 and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance-IPA);16
? promotion of the European integration process and raising public awareness.
The structure of the Ministry of European Integration involves four Directorates:
12 Order of the Prime Minister No. 33, dated 02/04/2007.
13 This body is also expected to establish separate working groups for each of the chapters of the EU acquis. For
more details please refer also to Alfred Kellermann, “Report on Guidelines for an effective approximation of
Albanian legislation”, E drejta parlamentare dhe politikat ligjore 38 (2007): 12-52.
14 The Minister of Integration was the Albanian chief negotiator in the EU-Albania negotiations for the
Stabilization and Association Agreement and will hold the same position in the eventual membership
negotiations.
15 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation.
16 The Minister of European Integration has been appointed National Aid Coordinator for the Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA).
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? Directorate of Justice and Home Affairs
? Directorate of Internal Market
? Directorates of Integration Process and Institutional Support
? Directorates of Internal Services.
The first three directorates are particularly involved in the day-to-day work regarding the
progress of the European Integration process and they cover almost all key aspects of this
process. While there is no special department or section dealing with approximation issues, a
sector-based approach is deemed to better cover these aspects within each field. See table 3.2.
for the organisational structure of the Ministry of European Integration. See Table 1.3.
Table 3.2. Organisational Structure of the Ministry of European Integration
Source: Ministry of European Integration of the Republic of Albania.
Another important governmental body deeply involved in the European integration process is
the Albanian Negotiators Group which is led by the Minister of European Integration and
involves high representatives of line ministries and other central level institutions. This body
is in charge of coordination, monitoring and implementation of all sector-based activities
related to the SA process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and particularly the European
Integration Department has the duty to promote and support Albania’s EU integration efforts
on high political  level within the EU. In the framework of the Stabilization and Association
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Process, the Albanian MFA is responsible for the advancement of the political dialogue with
EU member states and other countries (particularly SAP countries).
In addition to the above described (macro-level) structures, the Albanian Government
also established specialized European Integration Units (EIU) in all line ministries to act as
focal points for EU-related assistance, reporting and monitoring. The Decision of the Council
of Ministers No. 179, dated 22/2/2006 outlines the responsibilities of these units, which
involve:
a. internal coordination, ensuring direct links and cooperation with the MEI and other
line ministries regarding the obligations the country has assumed with the SAP;
b. internal institutional coordination and coordination with the MEI and other line
ministries regarding the approximation of legislation and reporting on legal acts
adopting the acquis communautaire under TAIEX;
c. internal institutional coordination regarding the preparation of reports on the process
of European integration;
d. monitoring and reporting within the ministry on EU integration matters;
e. data sharing on the EU integration process between the ministry, the MEI and EIUs in
other line ministries;
f. assessing the performance of the institution in the process of European integration;
propose functional mechanisms facilitating sectorial reforms, implementation of the
SAA through approximation of Albanian legislation with acquis communautaire and
strengthening the administrative capacities;
g. recommending priorities, planning of activities and human resources for the
institutional support of the European integration process.17
Considering the new stage of the country’s SA process (having signed the SAA and with the
Interim Agreement in force), further improvements in the capacities of the Ministry of
European Integration and other line ministries are certainly required.  The implementation of
the Interim Agreement and other SAA obligations call attention to the need for better
administrative capacities, enhanced coordination and continuous consultations not only within
the governmental matrix, but also with other institutions (Parliament, oversight institutions
etc.) and civil stakeholders. Almost two years from the signing of the SAA, such challenges
may well result in the need for a more advanced structure of the Ministry of European
Integration and new coordinating and interacting mechanisms between the line ministries on
17 The Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 179. also indicates in Annex I the specific sectors which will be
covered by EIUs in each line ministry.
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EU integration related matters, including the establishment of EIUs in other governmental
agencies and independent institutions as well. Furthermore, there is a need for further
strengthening the capacities of the European Integration Units in the line ministries which at
present perform mainly coordinative functions (as a link between the respective ministry and
the MIE) with no substantial involvement in the target fields and the impact of EU integration
on  the  areas  managed  by  the  respective  ministry.  Namely,  in  order  to  turn  these  units  into
specialized cells that could provide expertise for all individual fields covered by a ministry as
specified in Annex I of the Decision No. 179., more attention should be paid to the
implementation of point 2 of this decision: “The European Integration Units must coordinate
and support the work of the respective institutions regarding the main elements of the acquis
communautaire in the target fields, appropriate to the SAA implementation, as outlined in
Annex I  attached to this decision”.  The emphasis in on the supporting role,  which the EIUs
are currently not quite able to fulfill.
The analysis above suggests that the development of Albanian governmental structures
in charge of the EU integration process may be divided into three phases which in fact reflect
not only the pace of Albania’s integration efforts, but also the problems of the overall
economic and political consolidation of an emerging democracy:
a) the pre-1997 period – the MFA’s special department is in charge of EU integration;
b) the period between 1997 and 2004– characterized by experiments with various
institutional solutions;
c) the post-2004 period, which starts with the setting up of the Ministry of European
Integration.
Although at first sight it seems that the internal developments – the 1997 collapse and its
social, economic and political consequences or the Kosovo refugee’s crisis in 1999 – have not
affected the European integration process, the 1997-2002 period particularly demonstrates
that attention of the government was attracted by other, more pressing matters such as security
and political instability (rather than the SAP). Despite the sporadic efforts to develop a sound
institutional  framework  in  charge  of  EU integration  during  this  period,  solutions  were  often
fragile in the face of political manoeuvring. The establishment of the State Minister for
European Integration in 2001, followed an almost 2-year period during which a special
department at the MFA was assigned to cover this portfolio. (much like the pre-1997 period).
Yet, even this move is often judged as an institutional solution to help appease internal
political disputes (within the ruling party and within the ruling coalition) rather than to
support the SAP as such. The European Commission has also underlined these shortcomings
13
in its first Report on Albania’s Stabilization and Association Process (2002), though in a more
tactful manner:18
“Since 1998, the governing Socialist Party has been working hard to stabilise Albania and to promote
Euro-Atlantic integration. The actions carried out by the Socialist-led governments have, overall, yielded
relatively good results and have been central to Albania’s progress in the Stabilisation and Association
process.
 The work of the Government issued from the June 2001 elections was severely affected by the internal
conflict within the SP between the party chairman and the Prime Minister. This crisis led to serious
accusations of corruption against that Government, and provoked the resignation of several key ministers
and ultimately of the Prime Minister himself (…) As in the past, the new Government identifies the
European integration process as a main priority for its mandate and the portfolio of Minister of State for
European Integration established in September 2001 has been maintained. However, political
manoeuvring within the ruling party is still frequent. This poses a threat for stability and slows down the
reform process.”19
The establishment of the Ministry of European Integration however is only the beginning of
the consolidation of governmental structures’ dealing with the integration process, which is a
continuous process itself. While critiques and strong recommendations continued to be
delivered to Albania by the EC, the setting up of the Ministry and its improved role in the SA
process  were  underlined  as  positive  developments  in  the  EC  2004  report.20 The subsequent
reports (2005 – 2007) of the European Commission on the Albanian SAP confirm that the
Ministry of European Integration, as an institutional solution, has undoubtedly improved this
process.
Yet, as previously argued, the new phase in which Albania’s EU integration process
has entered, requires further consolidation of both MEI’s and other line ministries’ capacities.
18 However, the second EC report (2003) concludes in a more comprehensible style that “European integration
has remained a declared top priority for all Governments, but their actions have not always supported these
declarations.” See European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2003” Commission
Staff Working Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2003 139), 5.
19 European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2002” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2002 163), 6-7. Emphasis in original.
20 Note that the 2003 EC Report emphasized the need for better capacities and leadership of the Department for
European Integration (under the authority of the State Minister for European Integration). European
Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2003” Commission Staff Working Document
(Brussels: European Commission, COM 2003 139), 19.
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2.2. Structure of Parliamentary Dealings with Matters of EU relations
The progress regarding the Albanian parliamentary dealings on EU integration matters display
a rather humble development. This is partly due to the country’s progress until 2002-2003 and
partly to the political disputes between the ruling coalition and the opposition. During this
period the role of the Parliament was limited to inter-parliamentary meetings with EU
counterparts (five EU-Albania inter-parliamentary meetings till 1999). EU integration related
matters were being discussed under the Parliamentary Commission of Foreign Affairs while
little attention was paid to the approximation of legislation. Nevertheless, the preparation for
and the opening of the SAA negotiations,  the setting up of a Parliamentary Commission on
European Integration, the consolidation of the governmental bodies in charge of EU
integration and the adoption of a National Plan for the Approximation of Legislation with EU
acquis, somehow influenced a more active role of the Albanian Parliament in the SA process
which despite some sporadic improvements, still failed to meet the expectations.
Few months before the start of the negotiations for the Stabilization and Association
Agreement with the EU, the Albanian Parliament established an ad hoc Parliamentary
Commission on European Integration.21 This parliamentary structure was expected to increase
the involvement of the legislative body in the European integration process not only through
control but also through direct support to Albania’s efforts in this context. The Commission
aimed at attaining the following goals:
a) encourage  Albania’s  EU  integration  process  and  the  implementation  of  the  Stability
Pact as an instrument that brings the country closer to Europe;
b) inter-parliamentary coordination of the Parliament’s permanent commissions;
c) coordination  of  the  policies  of  the  Parliament,  Council  of  Ministers  and  other
institutions related to the SAA and the Stability Pact;
d) compliance of Albanian legislation with EU standards and requirements;
e) strengthening the cooperation of the Albanian Parliament with the European
Parliament,  parliamentary assemblies of the Council  of Europe (CoE) and the OSCE
in order to encourage the implementation of the Stability Pact and acceleration of the
SA process;
21 Decision No. 37, dated 16/05/2002 “On the establishment of a Parliamentary Commission on European
Integration and the Stability Pact”. Following the recommendations of the European Commission in its 2004
progress report, this Commission was transformed into a Permanent Parliamentary Commission in 2005. This
measure was acknowledged as a need by the Parliament in its Resolution of June 10th 2004.
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f) establish parliamentary cells for conflict prevention in the region and exchange of
information between the parliaments;
g) strengthening the cooperation with parliamentary bodies in the region, exchange of
experiences on the SAP;
h) meeting the necessary requirements and obligations in the fields of economy, justice,
political situation and environment for the opening of the SAA negotiations;
i) ensuring transparency and cooperation with civil society in the process of European
integration and the implementation of the Stability Pact;
j) organizing regular parliamentary debates on the fight against organized crime and
human trafficking thus ensuring that this problem has the attention of the national
political agenda;
k) informing the Parliament on policies on democracy, security and economic
developments in the framework of Stability Pact and other regional initiatives such as
SEECI, SEECO, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative etc.
If confronted with the current reality of the European integration process, it becomes clear
that the Parliamentary Commission needs to adjust its goals. The amendments to the decision
establishing the commission were exclusively related to names of MPs nominated as members
of the commission and so far no adjustments have been proposed to its scope of work. Some
of the aspects that the Commission needs to reflect in its legal basis and further work include:
? the recent progress of Albania’s SAP - IA in force, SAA ratification by EU members,
the National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA, the National Strategy for
Development and Integration,  as well  as the overall  progress and future prospects of
these developments;
? the new challenges to Albania’s EU integration process which certainly cannot be
limited only to the fight against organized crime and human trafficking;
? the forthcoming developments in the Stability Pact;
? the  role  of  Albanian  stakeholders  (civil  society,  private  sector  etc.)  in  the  process  of
EU integration;
? the current governmental structures involved in the SAP and the challenges related to
sound capacities for better tackling SAP obligations;
? monitoring of and assistance to the process of addressing the SAP related obligations
and reforms.
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These amendments would help the Commission to adjust its work to the current progress and
settings  of  the  SA process,  while  they  may well  have  an  impact  on  the  overall  work  of  the
Albanian legislative body and on the performance of other parliamentary commissions (which
must ensure compliance of Albanian legislation with EU standards and laws).
On a bilateral, EU-Albania level, an important structure that includes the Albanian
Parliament in EU integration related matters is the European Parliament-Albania Inter-
Parliamentary meetings. This structure was established in the early 1900’s (with its first
meeting held in 1992), following two election observation missions of the European
Parliament in March 1991 and March 1992. Meetings between representatives of both
parliaments are held once a year and so far there have been 14 meetings. The last meeting
took place in October 2007.
Depending on the stage of the SA process, the inter-parliamentary meetings focus on various
topics  and  concerns  with  an  aim  to  accelerating  EU  integration  reforms  and  increasing  the
role of the Parliament in that course. There is also a practice of alignment of the Albanian
Parliament with the declarations and positions to the European Parliament (mainly on external
relations).
The  SAP  requires  that  the  parliament  no  longer  has  a  vague  role  and  influence  on
European integration matters. Constructive dialogue and consensus should now involve the
specific aspects of the integration process, thus leaving the frames of declaratory support to
EU integration as a strategic goal. Furthermore, improvements of parliamentary structures
dealing with EU matters should be accompanied with efforts aiming to improve expertise and
capacities of this institution.22
Needless to say, the Parliament and the Government do not compete to take leadership
over the SA process (despite the ill-formulated phrases in some documents/resolutions), but
rather build partnerships with key actors in order to map out sound policies and reforming
processes. Quite an important task for the parliamentary bodies is also the monitoring of the
overall performance of the country’s SAP and the response to the eventual shortcomings that
it should design in cooperation with other stakeholders.
22 The  last  two  reports  of  the  European  Commission  make  an  explicit  reference  to  this  requirement.  See
European Commission, “Albania Progress Report 2006” Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels:
European Commission, COM 2006 649), 5; and European Commission, “Albania Progress Report 2007”
Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2007 139), 6.
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The character of the issues which recent analysis and EC reports attach to the
Parliament’s domain (either through criticism or recommendations) demonstrates that the
institution has already entered a new phase which requires a substantial  expertise and input.
Consequently, the criteria that will be used to scrutinize the role of the Parliament in the SA
process will now asses not only whether the institution has succeeded in imposing itself
(through partnerships, rather than through boycotts) as an active actor in this process, but also
the excellence and the impact of such involvement in the overall European integration
process.
3. Contractual and Political Relations with the EU
Professor  Elke  Thiel  argues  that  Albania’s  European  integration  has  to  be  understood  as  a
gradual process and each step has to be implemented properly. Referring to a German
expression “der Weg ist das Ziel” (“the road is the goal”) she further suggests that: “EU
membership may be the final objective. Yet, it is the “European journey” that brings
rewards”.23 Albania’s European journey however does not display quite the characteristics of
a step-by-step experience, as the setbacks have often delayed the reforms and consequently
the progress through the various phases of the integration process.
Almost 15 years have passed since the first contractual relationship with the EU (the
European Community at  the time) until  Albania singed the SAA and an Interim Agreement
with the EU. Despite the setbacks and the slow pace of the process, the public’s support for
EU membership remains quite high, thus confirming its  position on the top of the country’s
priority agenda. Yet, Albania’s political commitment has often failed to address priority
concerns and to achieve tangible results in the reforming processes which have on the other
hand delayed socio-economic development, democratic consolidations and the EU integration
process itself.
The subsequent part of the chapter will analyze Albanian political relations with the
European Union by focusing on the key events that have marked the EU integration process.
Appendix table 3.1. provides a summary of the events which will be further analyzed in order
to better understand the Albanian journey towards the EU.
The analysis of the main events will focus on the Albania-EU political and contractual
relations in three periods: a) 1992 – 1999, the pre-SAP period; b) 1999 – 2003, until the
23 ElkeThiel, “European Integration of Albania: Economic Aspects”, Bamberg Economic Research Group on
Government and Growth Working Paper 49 (2004).
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launch  of  the  SAA  negotiations;  and  c)  2003  –  Present.  Obviously,  the  timeframes  of  the
various periods in the analysis of Albania-EU relations do not fully reflect those of the
development of Albanian governmental structures in charge of EU integration process. This is
due  to  the  fact  that  the  analysis  on  the  bilateral  relations  involves  not  only  Albania-related
developments  but  also  the  developments  in  the  EU’s  approach  towards  the  country  and  the
region as a whole. On the other hand, the first section clearly concludes that the overall
development of governmental structures in charge of EU integration have not always reflected
the pace and the needs of the process.
3.1. Moving Towards the Stabilisation and Association Process 1992-1999
Albania is part of the Stabilization and Association Process which represents a policy
framework of the European Union guiding the Western-Balkan countries (WB) on their path
towards EU membership. The current relations with the Union are based on the principles and
objectives outlined in the Stabilization and Association Agreement (signed in June 2006)
which is undergoing the ratification procedure by the EU member states, and on the
provisions of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters with the EU (in force
since December 2006).
Albanian relations with the EU (at that time, European Communities) were established
following the fall  of the Communist  regime. In view of the economic and political  crisis,  as
well  as the turbulent 1991-1992 events in the country,  the European Community announced
an emergency plan worth 45 million US dollars. Soon afterwards Albania also became
eligible for funding under the PHARE program.24 The contractual relations between Albania
and the EU were for the first time established through the signing and the entry into force of
the “Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Albania,
on trade and commercial and economic cooperation”.25 The 1992 Agreement however was
not simply an act  regulating the trade and economic relations between the parties.  Rather,  it
was an essential document that would pave the way for a closer relationship based on the
principles of consolidated democracies and eventually for the achievement of Albania’s goal
– Albania as a member of the EU – despite the lack of consensus among member states for
24 The PHARE programme was set up by the European Community in 1989 following the collapse of the
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The acronym “Phare” is derived from the French
“Pologne/Hongrie: Assistance à la Restructuration Economique” (Poland/Hungary: Assistance to the Economic
Reconstruction). The programme aimed at helping the recipient countries transform their economies, strengthen
democracy and meet the conditions required for future membership of the EU.
25 Official Journal L 343, 25/11/1992 P. 0002-0009. The signing of the SAA and the entry into force of the
Interim Agreement has replaced the 1992 Agreement.
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eastwards enlargement. According to Nikos Frangakis26 this type of agreement represented
less of a commitment from the EU as compared to the so-called Europe Agreements (signed
with the Central and Eastern European countries). EU accession was not originally the goal of
neither agreements, that is neither Albania’s 1992 Agreement nor the Europe Agreements.
Nevertheless, the latter clearly outlines a framework for  political dialogue and an association
relationship between the parties, whereas these aspects are lacking from Albanian’s
agreement with the EU.27
The 1992 Agreement with the European Community referred to the recent political
changes in the country, recognizing Albania’s wishes to stabilize and consolidate democracy,
as well as the “importance of giving full effect to all the provisions and principles of the
CSCE28 process, and in particular those set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the concluding
documents of the Madrid, Vienna and Copenhagen meetings, and those of the Charter of Paris
for a new Europe, particularly with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights, as
well as those of the Bonn CSCE Conference on Economic Cooperation”. Furthermore, the
preamble of this agreement reads that the contractual links “will contribute to progress
towards the objective of an association agreement in due course, when conditions are met”.29
The Joint Declaration between the EC and its Member States in parallel with the Agreement
provided the framework for a bilateral  political  dialogue with Albania.  On the other hand, a
Joint Committee (Article 18 of the 1992 Agreement) with Albanian and Community
representatives was established with an aim to ensure the proper functioning of the dialog as
well as to devise and recommend practical measures for achieving its objectives, keeping in
view the economic and social policies of the Contracting Parties. Accordingly, all the
instruments for further developing and consolidating the relationship with the EU were in
place during the 1990’s and prospects for an association partnership certainly remained
open.30
26 Nikos Frangakis, “The Impact of Contractual Relations Between EC/EU and Central and Eastern European
Countries in Solving Local Conflicts”, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy Occasional Paper
OP09.08., http://www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/files/op9808.PDF.
27 Political dialogue between Albania and the EU was regulated through a Joint Declaration between the EC and
its Member States. In the case of the Europe Agreements this aspect was an integral part of the agreement.
28 CSCE – Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the predecessor of the OSCE (Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe).
29 Preamble of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Albania, on
trade and commercial and economic cooperation (1992).
30 Needless to say, the 1992 Agreement had a different structure and did not involve aspects dealt with by the
Europe Agreements, such as the approximation of laws and other issues characterizing an association partnership
between parties.
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In the framework of the Albania-EU political dialogue there have been four meetings
at ministerial level (1994, 1996, 1998 and 1999) and five inter-Parliamentary meetings.
Meetings of the Joint Committee were held in 1994, 1998 and 1999 while during this period
several sectorial working parties were also established on:
? Approximation and reform of legislation (1994)
? Customs cooperation (1994)
? Economic and financial matters (1998)
? Agriculture (1999)
? Infrastructure (1999)
Three years after the entry into force of the 1992 agreement, Albania submitted a request for
opening of negotiations for an association agreement, i.e. a Europe Agreement establishing an
association between Albania and EU member states. However, an assessment of the European
Commission in June 1995 on subjects such as free trade in goods and services, establishment
and capital movement led to the conclusion that a “classical” Europe Agreement could not be
envisaged. Six months later, the General Affairs Council asked the Commission to submit
formal proposals for a new agreement with a view to enhancing relations with Albania. The
General Affairs Council conclusions of the 13th May 1996 further indicated that such an
agreement should constitute an important step towards a sui-generis association agreement.
Meanwhile, the EU’s optimism for an advanced level of contractual relationship with Albania
was challenged by the parliamentary elections in May 1996 which failed to meet democratic
standards  (see  Chapter  1).  The  breakdown  of  the  pyramid  schemes  which  took  place  soon
after and the collapse of the state in a few months prevented the European Commission to
proceed with draft negotiating directives.31 Accordingly,  Albania  lost  the  chance  to  become
the first WB country to move closer to the European Union through a new and more advanced
contractual relationship.32
Meanwhile, some interesting developments were taking place at the regional level.
Following the shocking events of the Balkans, the EU realized that a substantial intervention
through a regional approach was essential in order to contribute to long-lasting peace and
prosperity in the region. Yet, despite the terror during the Bosnian war and the strong “hints”
for further turmoil in the region, the EU’s first steps were quite insecure and with an unclear
31 For more details see European Commission, Commission Report on the Feasibility of Negotiating a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania. (Brussels: European Commission, COM 1999 599 final),
4-5.
32 In fact, it took exactly 10 years (from 1996 to 2006) for Albania to attain this status.
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perspective for these countries.  In December 1995, the Royaumont Process for Stability and
Good Neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe was initiated by EU Ministers in Royaumont
(France). The initial objective of the Royaumont Process was to guide the implementation of
the Paris/Dayton Peace Plan,  and at  the same time to incorporate it  into a wider perspective
covering the whole region. However, since the perspective that was offered to the countries of
the region was neither accommodated to the needs of each single country nor offered a clear
perspective of European Integration, they quickly lost interest in the Royaumont-Process.33 In
fact, few years after the initiation of this Process, in 1999, the Berlin-based think tank
European Stability Initiative (ESI) concluded that “it is not clear what the contribution of the
Royaumont Process consisted in.”34
3.2. Walking the Road to a Stabilization and Association Agreement 1999-2003
Soon after the Royaumont Process was launched, the EU decided to take further steps in order
to  offer  a  clear  perspective  to  the  Balkan  countries.  On  the  26th February  1996,  the  EU’s
General Affairs Council adopted a Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern
Europe. Two months after this meeting, the General Affairs Council (on the 29th April 1997)
established political and economic conditions to be fulfilled by these countries, as the basis
for a coherent and transparent policy towards the development of bilateral relations in the
field of trade, financial assistance and economic cooperation, as well as of contractual
relations.35 To sum up, the EU agreed to establish, in the framework of the regional approach,
political and economic conditions as the basis for a coherent and transparent policy towards
the development of bilateral relations, allowing for the necessary degree of flexibility.36 The
conditions set out by the Council conclusions involved general conditions applying to all
countries, and specific conditions dealing with country-specific issues. Five Conditionality
Reports on the compliance of the countries of South-Eastern Europe with the conditions set
out in the Council Conclusions (1997) were prepared by the Commission from 1997 to 2000.
In general, the Council conclusions on Albania have to do with the most acute issues
the country faced such as security and consolidation of the rule of law, while less emphasis
was put on the genuine membership criteria (Copenhagen and Madrid criteria). This was
33 Judith Hoffmann, “Integrating Albania: The Role of the European Union in the Democratization Process”.
Albania Journal of Politics 1 (2005): 58-59.
34 European Stability Initiative, The Stability Pact and Lessons from a Decade of Regional Initiatives (Brussels:
ESI, 1999), http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_1.pdf
35 See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/028a0057.htm.
36 The concept of conditionality involved all countries in South-Eastern Europe without an Association
Agreement, i.e. it also included Albania besides the former Yugoslav republics.
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understandable in view of the developments at that time, few months after the 1997 events
and the Kosovo refugee crisis. Nevertheless, the Council conclusions in all five reports were
strongly encouraging Albanian efforts to stabilize the situation and move on with other
challenges.
In  1999,  the  regional  approach  was  developed  into  the  EU  Stabilisation  and
Association  Process.  In  the  Operational  Conclusions  of  the  26th May 1999 (following the
publication of the fourth conditionality report) the European Commission proposed the
creation of a Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western-Balkan countries. This
process did not a priori change the conditions applying to the development of bilateral
relations or for the start  of negotiations on contractual relations.  What was changed was the
nature of the contractual relations on offer – replacing the prospect of a Cooperation
Agreement with that of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. This notes a historic
turning point in the relations between the WB countries and the EU as a prospect of EU
integration was thereby offered.
This offer was further reinforced at the Feira European Council (19th-20th June 2000)
which granted a European perspective to the WB countries – “all the countries concerned are
potential candidates for EU membership”. Five months later, the Stabilization and Association
Process was officially endorsed at the Zagreb Summit (November 2000).
The Zagreb Summit was not such a happy event for Albania as it was for Croatia and
Macedonia. Albania’s second attempt to enhance its contractual relationship with the EU
failed on year before (1999) due to the insufficient preparedness of the country. This was the
conclusion of the EC Report on the feasibility of negotiating a Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with Albania.37 In order to speed up the pace of integration an EU-Albania High
Level Steering Group (HLSG) was set up following the Zagreb Summit, with the objective of
identifying and supporting the reforms to be carried out. Based on the conclusions of the
HLSG, the Commission concluded in June 2001 that:
“Albania is not yet in the position to meet the obligations of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement.
However, if the current pace of change is sustained and if sufficient priority is given to strengthening
administrative capacity during the negotiating and transition periods, considerable improvements can be
made in the areas highlighted in this report. The Commission believes that the perspective of opening
Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations is the best way of helping to maintain the
momentum of recent political and economic reform, and of encouraging Albania to continue its
37 European Commission, Commission Report on the Feasibility of Negotiating a Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with Albania (Brussels: European Commission, COM 1999 599 final).
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constructive and moderating influence in the region. The Commission therefore considers it appropriate to
proceed with a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania, and it will in due course submit a
recommendation for a Council decision to open negotiations, which can, of course, only be concluded
when all appropriate conditions have been met.”38
It was clear that this decision was mainly political because the progress from 1999 to 2001, as
acknowledged by the Commission itself, was not enough to justify this step. However, the EU
decided this time to offer the first part of the “stick and carrot” approach, as an incentive for
tangible results. Draft negotiating directives were therefore submitted to the Council of the
EU and an EU-Albania Consultative Task Force (CTF) was set up in order to assist Albania to
prepare for the negotiation of a SAA. Yet, these directives, as adopted by the Council in
October 2002, clearly underlined that negotiations will only be concluded once Albania has
developed the necessary administrative capacity and structures to ensure compliance with its
SAA commitments. On the 31st January 2003, Commission President Romano Prodi officially
launched the negotiations for a SAA between the EU and Albania.
3.3. The SA Agreement: Negotiations and Implementation of the Interim Agreement
Prior to the opening of the SAA negotiations, the EU-Albania Consultative Task Force39 held
four preparation meetings (in 2001, March 2002, June 2002, November 2002) while three
additional ones took place in the first year of the opening of the negotiations (March 2003;
June 2003; and November 2003). The negotiations took three times longer than for Croatia
and Macedonia because Albania was moving too slowly, particularly with regard to the fight
against corruption and organized crime. Considering the country’s SAP record and the slow
pace  of  reforms  due  to  political  instability,  only  a  couple  of  months  after  the  launch  of  the
negotiations the European Commission warned that “at the current pace of reform
implementation, negotiations risk being long and drawn out. Before negotiations can be
concluded, Albania will need to demonstrate its ability to implement the provisions of the
future Agreement and to address the priority issues identified by the European Union through
its various reports and monitoring instruments”. In fact, the 2003 report concludes that a great
38 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council On the Work of the EU/Albania High
Level Steering Group, in Preparation for the Negotiation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with
Albania (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2001 0300 final.
39 The Consultative Task Force (CTF) was responsible for the monitoring of the sectorial reforms’
implementation and it issued joint recommendation on various concerns which are discussed at these meetings.
CTF should not be confused with the Joint Committee established under the 1992 Agreement and whose domain
included matters related to the implementation of that agreement.
24
part  of  the  recommendations  outlined  by  the  first  (2002)  EC  Report  on  the  Albanian  SAP
were either only partially implemented or not implemented at all.40 By  mid-2005  the  SAA
was practically negotiated, but due to lack of significant progress the European Commission
was still hesitating to propose the conclusion and signing the this agreement.41
Meanwhile, the Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003) reaffirmed WB countries’ European
perspective and emphasized that the “principles of ‘own merits’ and ‘catch up’ will be
applied, in parallel with the regional approach, which remains an essential element of EU
policy towards the region”.42 The Thessaloniki agenda further strengthened the Stabilisation
and Association Process by introducing new instruments to support the countries’ reform and
European integration efforts (such as European Partnerships), while it also stressed the need
for  enhanced  co-operation  in  the  areas  of  political  dialogue  and  the  Common  Foreign  and
Security Policy, parliamentary co-operation, support for institution building, and the opening
of Community programmes.
The first European Partnership with Albania was adopted by the European Council in
June 2004 and it outlined the short and medium-term priorities the country had to address for
further integration into the European Union, based on the analysis of the 2004 Annual
Report.43 The  Albanian  Government  prepared  an  Action  plan  for  the  implementation  of  the
European  Partnership  and  various  aspects  and  key  priorities  were  discussed  by  the
Consultative Task Force in five meetings held between March 2004 and September 2005.
Albania’s legislative body was also quite active in both: the drafting of the Action Plan on the
European  Partnership  (2004)  and  also  in  its  relations  with  the  European  Parliament  through
the EP-Albania Inter-Parliamentary meetings.44 A  national  Plan  on  Approximation  of
40 European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2003” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2003 139), 12-13, 17-18, and 33-34.
41 In his report to the European Parliament on the 13th April 2005, the Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn
states: “I have recently written to Prime Minister [Fatos] Nano to underline that the Commission will only be
able to propose the conclusion of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement if the
parliamentary elections this summer are conducted in accordance with international standards. Tangible
achievements must also be made in fighting corruption and organised crime.” See Olli Rehn, Progress in the
Western Balkans (Speech at the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, on the 13th April 2005),
http://www.delalb.cec.eu.int.
42 General Affairs and External Relations Council, Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving
towards European Integration,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/t
hessaloniki_agenda_en.htm.
43 2004/519/EC: Council Decision of 14 June 2004 On the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the
European Partnership with Albania. Official Journal L 223, 24/06/2004 P. 0020 – 0029. This Council Decision
was repealed with the Decision 2006/54/EC (January 30th 2006) on the revised Partnership with Albania, while
currently the Commission has proposed to the Council a new decision for the revised partnership following the
2007 Progress report.
44 Twelve EU-Albania inter-parliamentary meetings were held by November 2005 (first meeting was in 1992).
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Legislation (2004) was also adopted while an Integrated Planning System was launched by
the  government.  The  holding  of  free  and  fair  parliamentary  elections  was  one  of  the
conditions  that  the  European  Commission  had  sought  for  the  conclusion  of  the  SAA
negotiations and this was successfully achieved in 2005.
Accordingly, one year later the European Commission acknowledged the progress
achieved (mainly in short term priorities), though it underlines that there is still much to do:
“Overall, Albania has made some progress in implementing the European Partnership’s short-term
priorities, but has not yet begun to address concertedly those set out for the medium term. Notable
progress has been made in the adoption of new legislation and in the formulation of action plans. In some
cases implementation has followed, but in many cases proper implementation has been hampered by a
difficulty in making available resources combined in some cases with a lack of political will.”45
Only a couple of months following the 2005 report and after ten technical and six official
rounds over a three-year period (January 2003-February 2006), the European Commission
decided to conclude the SAA negotiations. On the 12th June  2006  the  SAA  was  officially
signed  and  six  months  later  (1st December 2006) its trade related provisions – the Interim
Agreement – entered into force. The signing of the SAA had its own impact on the public’s
optimism and support for Albania’s EU integration process, which according to some surveys
had a declining tendency during the negotiations period.46 The SAA notes in fact a new phase
in the European integration process and requires concerted efforts not only from the
government, but also from other public institutions and stakeholders to address the eventual
shortcomings and speed up the reforms’ pace, particularly with regard to the rigorous
provisions regulating trade and economic matters. This agreement outlines not only clear
obligations in the framework of the SA process in the country, but more importantly, it also
gives clear deadlines within which these obligations must be addressed in order to move on to
other steps.47
45 European Commission, “Albania Progress Report 2005” Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels:
European Commission, COM 2005 561), 66.
46 See Eno Trimcev et al, Albania and European Union: Perceptions and Realities (Tirana: Albanian Institute for
International Studies, 2006), 7. The authors conclude that: “The 2006 survey shows that support for Albania’s
EU membership has increased significantly since 2005 from a low point of 83.9 percent in 2005 and 84.9 percent
in 2004 to 92.5 percent. That is, in 2006 the four year trend of constant decline in membership support has
changed. (…) This increase in support can be explained by the signing of the Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) between the European Union (EU) and Albania on June 12, 2006 which restored some
confidence and faith on the integration process”.
47 While there is no legal barrier that would prevent Albania to submit an application for acquiring the candidate
status in the next few years (even before SAA’s entry into force), it is now clear that a political decision (which
in any case would not be easy to reach with an EU with 27 Members) would be deeply based on the assessment
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3.3.1. Core elements of the SAA
The following constitute the most important elements of the SAA:
? provision for political dialogue (Title II);
? provisions on enhanced regional co-operation, including the perspective of
establishing regional free trade areas (Title III);
? the perspective of the establishment of a free-trade area between the EU and Albania
within ten years (Title IV);
? provisions on the movement of workers, supply of services, current payments and
movement of capital (Title V);
? the commitment by Albania to approximate its legislation to that of the EU (Title VI);
? provisions on co-operation in a wide range of fields, including justice, freedom and
security (Title VII);
? provision for the establishment of a Stabilisation and Association Council which
supervises the implementation of the SAA, establishment of a Stabilisation and
Association Committee and a Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee
(Title X).
While  it  has  been  only  a  year  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Interim  Agreement  (IA),  its
overall  progress  by  now  can  be  considered  as  satisfactory.  In  fact,  the  EC’s  2007  Progress
Report notes that progress in the IA’s implementation is present in several fields, despite
some limited deficiencies in some areas like state aid, intellectual, industrial and commercial
property rights etc.
From an institutional point of view, the Interim Agreement is still being managed by
joint (EU-Albania) structures established under the 1992 Agreement. This structure will be
replaced by the Stabilisation and Association Council upon the entry into force of the SAA.
The Stabilisation and Association Council shall regularly review the application of the
Agreement and the accomplishment by Albania of legal, administrative, institutional and
economic reforms in light of the Preamble and in accordance with the general principles laid
down by the Agreement. Also, it is this structure that will decide whether the country is ready
for the second stage in order to achieve full Association (article 6). The SA Council shall be
of the ability to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. The case of Turkey, but also the difficulties faced by
Macedonia  demonstrate that the EU will practice strictness in this regard (unlike the Bulgarian and Romanian
case).
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assisted in the performance of its duties by the SA Committee while it can also establish other
special committees or bodies. The SAA also establishes a Stabilisation and Association
Parliamentary Committee which is a forum for members of the Albanian Parliament and the
European Parliament to meet and exchange views (articles 116-122). Yet, unlike the
structures created by the Readmission and the Visa facilitation Agreements (see below) these
joint structures will be effective following the entry into force of the SAA.48
Parallel to the SAA negotiations, the European Commission and the Albanian
government entered in negotiations for a Readmission Agreement during 2003. The EC-
Albania Readmission Agreement was initialled on the 18th December 2003, it  was signed in
Luxembourg on the 14th April 2005 and one year later (May 2006) the agreement entered into
force.49 Although this agreement fulfilled one of the requirements which has repeatedly been
underlined in the progress reports (2002 and 2003), the European Commission still remains
suspicious regarding Albania’s capacities and ability to properly implement the act,
particularly with regard to provisions on third-country nationals and stateless persons.50
Two months after the entry into force of this agreement, in July 2006, the Commission
made a proposal to the Council for a mandate to negotiate a visa facilitation agreement. This
agreement complements the Readmission Agreement as they both facilitate people-to-people
contacts between citizens of the EU member states and citizens of Albania. The Visa
Facilitation and Readmission Agreement was officially signed in September 2007 (a couple of
months after it was initialled) and it entered into force on the 1st of January 2008.51 Visa
facilitation is a first step towards visa-free travel, which, according to recent surveys, is very
important for the Albanian public as they perceive it as the most important benefit from EU
membership. The visa facilitation agreement has advantages for some categories of Albanian
travellers (students, businessmen, journalists, researchers, civil society representatives etc.) in
the form of low visa fee rates, simplified and faster application procedures. Document
requirements will be simplified for certain groups of travellers, for example. Nevertheless,
while the EU has announced that this agreement will increase exchange with Albania and will
48 Article 12 of the Visa facilitation Agreement establishes a Joint Committee for management of the Agreement,
composed of representatives of the European Community and of the Republic of Albania. Article 18 of the
Readmission Agreement also sets up a similar structure (Joint Readmission Commission).
49 This agreement was ratified by the Albanian Parliament on the 23rd January 2006 with Law No. 9466. Article
22 of this Agreement foresees that provisions related to the readmission of third-country nationals will enter into
force two years after the entry into force of the agreement (i.e. on 1st May 2008).
50 In fact, this has been one of the conclusions which have been present in all six progress reports of the
European Commission. See Progress Reports on Albania’s SAP (2002: 29, 31; 2003: 28, 31; 2004: 32; 2005: 36;
2006: 40, 42; 2007: 44).
51 The visa facilitation Agreement was ratified by the Albanian Parliament in October 2007 with Law No. 9815.
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have a positive impact on the economic and democratic developments in the country, the
analysis shows that one should be very careful with such forecasts. The impact of this
agreement still remains to be seen, but in general it is very difficult to claim that it would
“positively influence the economic and democratic development of the country” as it reads in
the press release of the EC Delegation in Albania.52 For some aspects in fact the only positive
impact of the agreement is  that  it  prevents the worsening of the conditions to acquire a visa
but it certainly does not offer a facilitated environment. Also, the selective approach for the
categories which are object to this agreement can be hardly endorsed as a factor that would
“positively influence the economic and democratic development of the country”, with all due
respect to its  impact on the free movement of persons belonging to these categories and the
contribution they may offer to the country’s overall development as a consequence to this
benefit.
4. Economic Relations
Economic and trade relations of Albania with the European Economic Community were the
first fields of cooperation between the two parties. The Trade, Commercial and Economic Co-
operation Agreement which entered into force in December 1992 aimed at facilitating and
promoting economic relations and cooperation between the parties by granting the Most
Favoured  Nation  treatment  and  implementing  other  advantageous  measures  that  would  help
Albania to restructure its economy. In September 2000 the European Union granted the
opportunity for the country to benefit from its generous autonomous trade measures (ATMs)
under which it allowed free access to the EU market for all industrial products and improved
access for agricultural products including agricultural and fishery products. Furthermore, as a
member  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO),  Albania  assumed  the  obligation  to  work
towards full trade liberalization while the process of Stabilization and Association further
encouraged the country to consolidate progress in meeting economic and political standards,
as well as developments in other sectorial policies that would give rise to foreign investments
and thus to sustainable economic development.
Nevertheless, despite the preferential treatment in the framework of EU economic
relations and the continuous support in almost all problematic areas (democracy, economy,
infrastructure etc) Albania’s performance in this regard appeared to be quite depleted. The
country was not able to take real advantage of the generous autonomous trade preferences
52 See EC Delegation Press Release of the 10th April 2007 at www.delalb.cec.eu.int.
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granted by the EU, and according to EC reports this has been mainly seen as a consequence of
the deficient commercial networks and inability to meet the quality requirements of EU
markets.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a regional free trade area (CEFTA) is actually in force and
the country is now part of a regional trade integration effort that is designed to enhance
economic ties, increase the attractiveness and thus prepare WB countries to eventually join
the Union.53 From the perspective of EU economic relations, the signing of the SAA assumed
in addition the existence of better capacities of Albanian economy to cope with the
competitiveness of the single market and to make full use of the facilities that are offered
therein. At present, economic and trade relations with the European Union are regulated by
the Interim Agreement.54 While claiming that the economy was not sufficiently prepared for
such measures that promote an open market with the EU and also with the neighbouring non-
EU member countries, Albanian economic operators will now have to adopt a more
sustainable approach in both, taking advantage of the neighbouring markets and also in facing
the pressure of the regional economies and that of the European Union (gradually in the next
few years).
The subsequent sections will analyze patterns, current situation and future prospects of
various aspects influencing economic relations with the EU and economic development
opportunities  within  Albania.  The  section  will  focus  only  on  EU-related  aspects  of  the
developments in trade, foreign direct investments (FDI), migration, pre-accession fund’s
assistance and a general overview of infrastructure concerns, as the wider economic
conditions of Albania have been discussed in Chapter 2.
4.1. Foreign Trade with the EU
The European Union remains Albania’s main trading partner by far, with Italy and Greece
occupying the first two positions of commercial partner countries. Trade opening measures
have intensified their effects particularly in the last few years with the stabilization of
Albanian economy and recovery from the late 1990’s crisis and the strengthening of economic
exchange relations with neighbouring markets. However, although governmental actions to
ensure an open market economy have resulted in a positive trend of increasing volume of
Albanian exports to a certain degree, the latter still remains at considerably low levels as
53 The new Central European Free Trade Agreement entered into force in July 2007.
54 The 1992 Agreement on trade and economic cooperation will will remain in operation until the SAA is
ratified.
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compared to imports. Accordingly, a large trade deficit represents a permanent concern for the
Albanian economy which continues to be an import-oriented market where imports are by far
exceeding export volume (see section 2.1.7. in Chapter 2.)
The sharp tendency of increasing trade deficit of Albanian trade particularly with EU
member states began in the early 1990’s, following the fall of the Communist regime. Until
1994 the Albanian economy was unable to make use of the preferential treatment granted by
the Union. Although during the period between 1994 and 1997 (when the country faced a
serious security crisis)  the export  volume with the EU noted a small  but steady growth, this
fact did not affect the trade deficit due to the large levels of imports from EU countries. The
Albanian economy’s structure was since then formed as an import-oriented market with quite
moderate production capacities. Table 3.3. shows the country’s volume of exports to and
imports from the EU market until 1999.
Table 3.3. The Development EU-Albania Trade Relations, 1989-1999
Source: European Commission, Commission Report on the Feasibility of Negotiating a Stabilisation and
Association Agreement with Albania. (Brussels: European Commission, COM 1999 599 final), 18.
Italy and Greece have continuously represented the country’s main trade partners and trade
volume with these countries has constantly amounted to more than 50 percent of the trade
volume with EU members. In the last eight years there has been a growing tendency to
decrease the trade deficit with Italy through significant increase of the export volume, though
this has not affected trade deficit with the second most important trading partner, Greece. See
tables 3.4. and 3.5.
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Table 3.4. Albania’s Trade Volume with Italy, 1999-2007
Source: Albanian Center for International Trade, Free Trade Agreements (Tirana: ACIT, 2008), www.acit-al.org
Table 3.5. Albania’s Trade Volume with Greece, 1999-2007
Source: Albanian Center for International Trade, Free Trade Agreements (Tirana: ACIT, 2008), www.acit-al.org
With regard to the general trends in trade relations with the EU-27, the last Progress Report of
the EC published in 2007 reveals that for the past decade there is a tendency of steady (though
small)  decline in the volume of imports of goods from these countries.  However,  this is  not
accompanied  by  the  same  tendency  in  the  volume  of  exports  of  Albanian  goods  in  EU  27
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which means that the increase in trade relations with neighbouring non-EU countries may
partially explain the small declines in the volume of imports with the EU-27. See Table 3.6.
Table 3.6. Albania’s Trade with EU27, 1997-2007
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Share of exports
to EU27 countries
in value of total
exports (%)
89.8 94.2 95.6 93.2 91.3 92.6 93.8 90.9 89.4
Share of imports
from EU27
countries in value
of total imports
(%)
89.9 88.0 82.8 80.7 80.3 77.3 74.3 70.5 67.2
Source: European Commission, “Albania Progress Report 2007” Commission Staff Working Document
(Brussels: European Commission, SEC 2007 1429), 51
While observing a number of positive developments in Albania’s trade capacities, the last EC
Progress Report emphasizes that the trade deficit still represents a major concern which
continues to depend largely on significant remittances and other current transfers from abroad,
estimated at around 13% of GDP in 2006 or approximately 55% of the trade deficit.55
4.2. Foreign Direct Investments in Albania
As shown in section 2.1.9. in Chapter 2, Albania’s performance in attracting foreign direct
investments  until  early  2000  has  proved  to  be  very  low  compared  to  other  countries  in  the
region. Such patterns is not only a result of the lack of commitment to firmly move forward
with  reforms  and  consolidate  the  functioning  of  democratic  governance  system,  but  it  also
came as a consequence of a number of crisis which challenged development – the turmoil in
1990 and 1997, the 1999 refugee crisis. Furthermore, the constant problems with the energy
supply and other infrastructural concerns, as well as the continuous disputes on the Law on
property (restitution / compensation of properties) had additionally undermined the FDI trends
in the country and created a disadvantageous perception by investors on Albania as a high-
55 : European Commission, “Albania Progress Report 2007” Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels:
European Commission, SEC 2007 1429), 19.
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risk country.56 A comparative analysis of FDI in Albania and other countries in the region
shows that during this period the country’s performance was still  at  low levels (only Bosnia
and the Union of Serbia and Montenegro – two countries which faced far more severe crisis –
performed worse than Albania).57
It is difficult to analyze the effects of FDI on the overall situation of unemployment in
the country. Considering the still high levels of grey economy and the high migration rate (in
absence of a comprehensive registration of population) the official figures of unemployment
may not appear accurate. Nevertheless, the data suggest that the unemployment rate
(registered unemployment) continued to fall to 13.8 % in 2006, compared with 14.2% in 2005
(see section 2.1.10.3. in Chapter 2.). The highest increases in the number of new employees
were observed in the mining, manufacturing and services sectors which are the same sectors
where most FDI took place.  Furthermore,  the declining trend in the unemployment rate also
corresponds with the increased resources that the country has been attracted through FDI from
2000 onward. Yet, it would be wrong to assume that FDI is the main factor for this progress
as regards employment, not only due to the fact that Albania’s foreign direct investments have
not met expectations, but also due to other factors – expansion of national businesses,
employment programmes etc.
4.3. Labour Migration to the EU Since 1990
Emigration or outward migration of labour has been a characteristic that has accompanied
Albanian developments throughout the years, except for the Communist period when the
country practically isolated itself from the world. It was after the fall of the Communist
regime that this phenomenon reached quite high figures. There are three main emigration
waves of Albanian citizens in the past 18 years: a) the period between 1990 and 1992; b) the
period between 1997 and 1998; and c) the brain drain wave of migration. While the first two
waves took place mainly as a result of the economic and security situation (such as the 1997
crisis), the last wave’s reasons have to do with educational purposes.58
The main destination of Albanian emigration involved EU member states, particularly
neighbouring  countries  such  as  Italy  and  Greece.  During  the  first  wave,  a  mass  flight  of
perhaps 200,000-300,000 Albanians took place, seeking refuge and work abroad, the
56 In fact the consequences of such perceptions are still present and this has been acknowledged as one of the
reasons why Albania is not experiencing any FDI-expansion.
57 World Bank, Report on Albania (Washington D.C.: IBRD, 2004), 141.
58 Eno Trimcev, Albanian Brain Drain: Turning the Tide (Tirana: Albanian Institute of International Studies,
2005).
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overwhelming majority in EU member states. During 1993-1996 the country’s economy
appeared to progress and some emigrants were returning and investing in their home country.
Yet, despite the good record of economic progress the country was still unable to provide
enough jobs for the active population (70,000 young people annually entering the labour
market) and unemployment rate by the mid 1990’s was at 20%.
The 1997 crisis and collapse of the state added to economic reasons for migration also
security related issues and concerns. Kosta Barjaba (2000) published official government
estimates  of  the  total  number  of  Albanian  emigrants  living  abroad  in  January  2000  and  the
data revealed that according to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs approximately
800,000 emigrants (documented and undocumented migrants) had left the country until 1999,
with 500,000 in Greece and 200,000 in Italy. Other countries hosting significant numbers of
Albanians included Germany (12,000), the United States (12,000), the United Kingdom
(5,000), Canada (5,000), Belgium (2,500), France (2,000), Turkey (2,000), Austria (1,000),
Switzerland (1,000) and Australia (1,460). Emigration has been a major factor in the financial
survival of the country since 1990 and in the maintenance and improvement of the livelihood
of Albania’s population through remittances (see section 2.1.8.1.). Immigrants’ savings in
2004 reached the level of 5 billion US dollars or 70% of Albania’s GDP. Remittances
represent the main instrument for addressing the trade deficit concern (60 % of the country’s
trade deficit) and they actually stand at 15-20 % of the GDP.59
The latest studies show that a great part of migrants of the first two migration waves
are less optimistic about their return in Albania. Namely, in the past years they have not only
succeeded to integrate themselves in the societies where they live, but through family reunion
they tend to build their families’ future in these countries. This assumption is also supported
by the recent projects of experts regarding the decreasing tendency in the volume of
remittances for the next 10 to 15 years. Considering the fact that there is still a considerable
number of illegal migrants particularly in EU countries (UK, Italy, Greece etc.) the
readmission agreements’ effect on Albanian migrants may involve only this category and
thus, the number of Albanian emigrants will still remain at high levels.
In the past few years the Albanian government has been increasingly focusing on
migration and it improved legal and policy related measures promoting the return of Albanian
59 Kosta Bajraba, Albania: Migration and Development. Exiting from vulnerability in Global Migration System,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/17/38528665.pps#15.
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emigrants following a gap-analysis.60 Nevertheless, the main resources and actions are
focused on the brain drain phenomenon and considering the circumstances it is expected that
the main community to respond to these policies will be only Albanian emigrants of the third
wave of migration (Albanians that left the country for educational purposes). An additional
factor that gives reason for optimism in this sense is the fact that according to recent studies,
the  main  reason  that  is  holding  third  wave  migrants  back  is  not  related  to  incomes,  but  to
career-related issues and the functioning of the state institutions (particularly as regards the
hiring-firing practices).61
4.4. EU Pre-Accession Funds
Albania’s endeavours in the framework of its EU integration process have been continuously
assisted by the support and financial assistance of the European Union. From 1991 to 2007
the country has benefited from three main EU financial assistance programmes aimed at
supporting this process: PHARE, CARDS and IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance,
covering the period 2007-2013). In addition, the country has benefited also from other
specific  programmes  designed  to  support  the  development  of  various  sectors  such  as
education, human rights etc. The intervention of EU assistance in the country has been
continuously designed in accordance with the needs of the problematic areas which have
evolved and changed in different periods of the transition process. While PHARE assistance
was focussed more on developing the basic conditions for a market economy and also on
humanitarian aspects following the 1997 crisis and the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis, the
CARDS programme provided increased support to institution building and supporting the
governance system. Furthermore, considering the sharp infrastructure-related concerns in the
country, particular attention has been paid also to this area through financial aid and
investments.62
Albania became a beneficiary country under the first assistance programme (PHARE)
in December 1991. From this period until October 1999 the European Union had granted a
60 Such analysis, focusing on the needs to align with EU acquis, has been carried out by International
Orgnization for Migration (IOM) with the financial support of the European Union in 2004. See International
Organization for Migration, Gap Analysis on Migration Management in Albania (Geneva: IOM 2004).
61 This is one of the main finding of Albanian Institute for International Studies survey with Albanian students /
scholars studying or working abroad. See Eno Trimcev, Albanian Brain Drain: Turning the Tide (Tirana:
Albanian Institute of International Studies, 2005).
62 Since the 1997 crisis, EC assistance (in particular PHARE) has concentrated on four key areas: public
administration reform (including customs, police and judiciary), large infrastructure (roads, water and ports),
agriculture and local development.
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total of approximately 620 million euros of assistance to Albania under the PHARE
programme. Until 2000 the overall Community assistance to Albania amounted at 1.02 billion
euros  (PHARE  and  other  programmes’  assistance,  as  well  as  EIB  loans).  Table  3.7.  shows
only the structure of PHARE support.
Table 3.7. Overall PHARE Assistance in Albania, 1991-2000 (million euros)
Note that the figures in this table include total amount of committed funds under PHARE programme only.
(1) Includes Transport, Energy, Telecommunications
(2) Includes Privatisation, SMEs, Banking, Tourism
(3) Includes Civil Service Reform, Supreme Audit Institution, Police, Statistics, Customs and Judiciary
(4) Includes feasibility studies in 1996 and the establishment of a Central Contracting and Financial Unit in
1999.
* Forecast
Source: European Commission, Commission Report on the Feasibility of Negotiating a Stabilisation and
Association Agreement with Albania. (Brussels: European Commission, COM 1999 599 final)
From 2001,  the  main  EC instrument  that  was  offering  financial  support  to  Albania  was  the
CARDS programme which covered the period until 2006.63 CARDS involved a long term
assistance  approach  that  aimed  to  address  the  needs  of  the  country  through  a  single
programme and to reflect  the ambitious objectives of the SAP. A major part  of the CARDS
programme focused on support for the judicial system and the police – construction and
renovation of courts, police and justice assistance missions (PAMECA and EURALIUS,
respectively), border management etc. Particular attention was dedicated also to the effective
functioning of the customs service which was a necessity not only as regards the fight against
63 The CARDS programme’s overall budget amounted to 4.6 billion euros for all Western Balkan countries until
the end of 2006. Out of this amount, some 2 billion euros were committed between 2001 and 2003.
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trafficking and organized crime, but also in view of Albania’s improved prospects to conclude
the SAA and focus increased resources for the implementation of the Interim Agreement.
Concerns over the functioning of the market economy and support to business and investment
environment represented an additional intervention area of the CARDS programme (support
in taxation, European standards such as standardisation, certification and inspection,
metrology, veterinary and phytosanitary inspection etc). Additional support was provided also
to consolidate democracy and the development of civil society, rural development,
community awareness and involvement of local communities in decision making, higher
education, vocational education and training, as well as a number of other problematic areas.
From 2001 to 2007, the CARDS programme allocated a total of 282.1 million euros to
advance Albania’s performance in the framework of the SA process.64
The new financial perspective for the period between 2007 and 2013 of the European
Union outlined a new assistance programme for candidate and potential candidate countries –
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) – which entered into force in January 2007.
The IPA consists of five components: (I) Transition Assistance and Institution Building, (II)
Cross-Border Cooperation, (III) Regional Development, (IV) Human Resources
Development, and (V) Rural Development. Only candidate countries can benefit from all five
components of the IPA programme while potential candidate countries (such as Albania) will
benefit  from  the  first  two  components  only.  IPA  assistance  to  Albania  is  planned  and
programmed in close cooperation with Albanian authorities and the European Commission’s
Representation in Tirana. The Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD), which
represents the key strategic document for IPA assistance to the target countries, has allocated
a total of 212.9 million euros of which 186.3 million euros will be allocated to component I
for institution-building and 26.6 million euros to component II for cross-border cooperation.
According to the National Programme 2007 which is designed in accordance with the MPID
priorities, the main areas are administrative capacity building and economic and social
development, with a particular focus on infrastructure.
Nevertheless, while the total assistance allocated by the European Union reaches
considerable levels, experience shows that Albanian administration still does not posses the
capacities to fully absorb this assistance. Accordingly, it remains to be seen what will be the
level of performance under the new financial instrument and this represents a major challenge
not only with regard to the actual stage of the EU integration process, but also in view of the
64 Data from the European Commission’s website, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-
candidate-countries/albania/eu_albania_relations_en.htm.
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medium-term objective of this programme to decentralize the management of financial
assistance and involve directly the Albanian authorities.
4.4.1. EU Support to Infrastructure Development
Major concerns over Albanian infrastructure in terms of transport and communication, as well
as reoccurring energy crisis have continuously hampered development pace in the country.
Following the opening of the country infrastructure appeared outdated and could not respond
neither to the needs of an open market economy (transport and communication) nor to the
needs of its citizens (energy). Albania has a strategic position as compared to other Balkan
countries that have no access to the Adriatic/Ionian See. Therefore, investments in road
infrastructure and building new connections with the main European transit routes entered the
development agenda as the main objectives in the early 1990’s. EU assistance has therefore
partially focused precisely on this component under the PHARE programme and latter with
the CARDS programme as well. However, the setbacks and the serious crisis that Albania
experienced during the first decade of its transition, as well as the continuous economic and
political problems, influenced a greater attention towards other concerns during this period.
One of the greatest deficiencies in this regard represent the fact that infrastructure
development remained mainly dependent on foreign assistance (EU) and only after 2000 did
the country start to take a more proactive role in this area.65 In addition to the consequences of
the various crises and thus, the lack of strong institutions, infrastructure concerns represent
another factor that has influenced economic development and especially the low performance
in attracting FDI. Infrastructure-related concerns have directly affected trade relations and
economic cooperation with neighbouring countries, as well as the economic development of
remote areas in Albania. The economic potential of the country for a long period was
concentrated in the triangle “Tirana – Durres – Elbasan” due to the fact that this area was
better equipped with the basic conditions: better energy supply, direct road and railway links
with the Port  of Durres and other communication means with EU market etc.  This is  in fact
also the main reason why internal migration flows, from rural and remote areas to urban areas,
were heavily focused in these cities.
During the first decade of the transition period investments in road infrastructure,
transport and energy depended mainly on donor assistance. The European Union had invested
65 Central government funding of local road maintenance effectively ended in 1991, and the breakdown of repair
vehicles because of a lack of spare parts threatened to close access to some remote areas.
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a total of 63.3 million euros under the PHARE programme alone in several projects on
transport, energy and telecommunications during the period between 1991 and 1999.
Development  of  Albanian  infrastructure  represented  one  of  the  main  priorities  also  of  the
CARDS  programme  and  various  projects  were  realized  under  this  programme  as  well  as
through the support of other EU financial assistance and loans (EIB). Yet, from 1997 to 2000-
2001 the main attention of foreign donors and political actors in Albania was focused on
restoring security, public order and the state institutions’ authority. Following the
improvement  of  the  security  situation  in  the  country  a  more  intense  work  on  road
infrastructure took place, particularly under the cabinet led by Ilir Meta. Road infrastructure
and connection of Albanian transport routes with regional and EU networks became a priority
of almost all governments since then, initially with the intention to boost economic
development, further expand industry and other business operations (beyond the Tirana –
Elbasan – Durres triangle) and lately, also with an aim to enhance performance in tourism.
Although, major improvements have been made over an almost seven-year period in
enhancing routes with neighbouring countries such as Tirana – Shkodra highway (towards
Montenegro), the southern corridor (with Greece) and the south-eastern connection (with
Macedonia), there is still a lot to be done in order to complete these projects. After a long
period of “thought”, the government started to implement, perhaps the biggest investment in
the entire Balkans, i.e. the Durres – Pristina highway, an investment which according to
experts  will  exceed  a  total  of  600  million  euros.  In  addition  to  strengthening  contacts  with
Kosovo, this investment will also positively influence the economic development of one of
the poorest areas of the country – the northern part.
There are considerable improvements in road infrastructure and the government puts
great emphasis on investments in economic development in general and in the tourism sector
in specific. Nevertheless, the energy sector and railways still remain major concerns which
continue to have an impact on the level of foreign investments. Furthermore, environmental
protection and sensitivity for environmental concerns generally remain low, while
governmental actions in this regard are still limited to political declarations, with very little
concrete results. There are a number of regional cross-border initiatives such as the Ohrid –
Prespa Lake Euroregion or other similar attempts in the north which focus on environmental
issues. However, results and impact of bilateral cooperation with the neighbouring countries
in this context remain limited and often stained by  disputes.66 The consolidation of the role of
66 For instance, although there is a bilateral agreement with Macedonia that regulates the water-flow from the
Drin river, it seems that this situation is not managed well during energy crisis.
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Albanian civil society has recently resulted in an increased pressure on governmental actions
in the field of environmental protection which sometimes experience clashes with major
infrastructural projects.67 Another positive element in the developments of infrastructure
(transport, telecommunications, energy) represents increased involvement of the local
business operators, particularly in the energy sector.
The variety of topics being discussed by state, civil and private stakeholders in the
field of infrastructure demonstrates that an improved approach is being employed by these
actors. In addition, the advancement of an inclusive debate on infrastructural concerns, from
strictly basic needs towards a more comprehensive attitude that analyses the impact of
infrastructure investments on other areas as well shows that Albania’s efforts in this regard in
the future may further improve. The assistance of the European Union under IPA structures as
well as the support of other financial mechanisms in the area of infrastructure will certainly
support governmental efforts in this regard. Nevertheless, the main challenges for Albanian
political actors include not only to increase national resources involved in these investments,
but particularly the consolidation of administrative capacities to attract foreign support and
better absorb these financial resources.
5. Legal Adaptation
The alignment of Albanian legislation with EU the acquis communautaire – in the form of a
structured development with clearly defined objectives and deadlines – is a relatively new
process and follows a certain level of advancement in the European integration process. In
fact, approximation of legislation as an obligation is mainly related to association agreements
such as Europe Agreements or the SAA. Due to the type of agreement signed in 1992 with the
EU (cooperation agreement) and the lack of progress in the relationship with the Union, the
time-gap between the first steps of EU integration and one of the most essential elements of
this process – approximation of legislation – in the Albanian case was quite long. The long
transition and the setbacks in that course have imposed during the 1990’s other priorities for
the European integration process and for the overall development of the country, which
postponed the approximation of legislation for almost a decade. In fact, support to Albania’s
approximation of legislation under the EC’s PHARE assistance amounts to only 0.3 million
67 One of such disagreements between environmental organizations joined by the Vlora local community and the
central government is currently taking place on the AMBO pipeline project – one of the greatest investments in
this field.
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euros between 1991 and 1999 period, which represents the least funded area.68 Alignment
with EU acquis was  an  almost  non-existent  idiom  not  only  in  the  legal  acts  regulating  the
bilateral relations but also in other, not-legally binding documents related to Albania’s
European integration process during this period.
Following the endorsement of the Stabilization and Association Process and in view of
the preparations for the SAA negotiations, Albania’s alignment process finally entered the EU
integration (political) agenda in rather concrete terms.69 However, concerns over the
implementation of aligned legislation due to various anomalies (lack of administrative
capacities, training etc.) constituted an additional element that had initially impaired this
process, particularly in its early phases. This, on the other hand, implies that the process of
approximation of legislation in Albania was often partially implemented, being more formal
than an  “effective implementation of legislation”.70
The subsequent sections of this chapter provide an overview of the process of
approximation of legislation since the early 1990’s until nowadays, while a thorough analysis
of the current state of affairs – actual progress and plans for future adaptation – will conclude
this section.
5.1. Albania’s Progress in the Field of Approximation of Legislation
In the context of EU integration,  the terms “approximation” or “harmonization” refer to the
process  of  adapting  the  legal  systems  of  associated  countries  to  the acquis communautaire
and, as previously mentioned, it involves not only the adaptation of laws but also their actual
implementation. This on the other hand requires a certain level of socio-economic
development and a sound record of performance of democratic institutions in order to allow
for an efficient rapprochement process. In fact, this has been the guiding philosophy of both,
68 Assistance for this area has been provided only for one year in 1994, when the working party on
”approximation and reform of legislation” was established. This body was not utilized for some years and it
restarted its activity only in 1999. See European Commission, Commission Report on the Feasibility of
Negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania. (Brussels: European Commission, COM
1999 599 final).
69 Although the 1998 Strategy for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (approved by the Council of Ministers
with Decision No. 752, dated 01/12/1998) mentions the alignment with EU acquis as a key objective for the EU
integration process, most of the Governmental actions and EC recommendations during this period lacked a clear
reference as regarding the level of alignment, thus focusing the struggle mainly on establishing a framework
respecting the basic standards.
70 At this point, the chapter refers to the approximation of legislation not only as a formal legal obligation (under
the SAA) but also as a strategic objective addressed in various strategic documents of the country. Accordingly,
this  part  of  the  chapter  will  discuss  the  process  of  alignment  with  EU acquis from  a  point  of  view  which  is
broader than the strictly legal settings of this process.
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the SA process and the last enlargement experience.71 Once confidence has been established,
an individual country can effectively address adaptation and implementation components of
approximation with EU acquis by  taking  further  steps  toward  a  closer  relationship  with  the
Union.
The 1992 Agreement between Albania and the European Community provided in this
sense a less advanced cooperation framework as it was focusing more on economic
cooperation and trade related matters. The only provisions to adjustment (but not
approximation) of legislation in this agreement (articles 13:2, 13:3, 13:4 and 14) dealt with
issues and concerns that would eventually facilitate trade relations and economic cooperation
between the parties.72 In contrast, the Europe Agreements of Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries reflected a higher level of political and economic maturity containing also the
legal obligation to start approximation with EU acquis.73 On the one hand it is understandable
that without an association partnership with EU there were no legal obligations of Albania to
align  its  legislation.  Yet  it  is  hard  to  find  even  references  to  recommendations  by  the  EU
addressed to Albanian authorities. For instance, the 3rd and  4th EC Annual Reports on the
implementation  of  the  Community  assistance  (PHARE)  mention  the  need  for  a  sound  legal
framework in Albania but only in the sense of developing minimum legal standards allowing
economic operations to function in an open market economy which was still under
construction at the time. Accordingly, it was still too early to put even in not-legally binding
documents (reports, EC Communications etc.) references such as “compliance with European
standards or EU acquis”.74
71 Article 70 of the Albanian SAA reads: “The Parties recognise the importance of the approximation of
Albania's existing legislation to that of the Community and of its effective implementation”.
72 The term „approximation” is not used in this agreement.
73 This has been made clear in several documents such as European Commission, Report from the Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament on common principles for future contractual relations with certain
countries in South-Eastern Europe (Brussels: European Commission COM 1996 476); European Commission,
Communication from the Commission to the Council. Follow up to Commission Communication on “The Europe
Agreements and Beyond: A strategy to prepare the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession”.
(Brussels: European Commission COM 1994 361) or European Commission, Communication by the
Commission to the Council, In view of the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen. 21-22 June 1993 –
Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Brussels: European
Commission SEC 1993 648). Source: University of Pittsburgh, Archive of European Integration
(http://aei.pitt.edu/). Date accessed November 27th – December 8th 2007.
74 European Commission, 3rd and 4th Annual Reports from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on the implementation of the Community assistance to countries of East and Central Europe
(PHARE) in 1992 and 1993 (Brussels: European Commission COM 1995 13). The same applies to European
Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on Regional Cooperation in Europe (Brussels:
European Commission COM 1997 659).. Source: University of Pittsburgh, Archive of European Integration
(http://aei.pitt.edu/). Date accessed November 27th – December 8th 2007.
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Albania’s process of approximation-related matters remained along the same lines in
the framework of the so-called regional approach.  In view of the developments at that time,
remarks and recommendations on legislative improvements in the economic area were
focused on the pyramid schemes. The conditionality reports, which were designed to monitor
compliance by the countries of South-Eastern Europe with the political and economic
conditions established by the Council (29 April 1997), practically underlined more or less the
same problematique by focusing on: democratic principles; rule of law, human and minority
rights; market economy reform; and regional cooperation.75 While  in  the  first  three
conditionality  reports  for  Albania  the  main  legal  adjustment-related  issues  to  which  the
European Commission drew attention had to do with the same concerns which were
characteristic for the pre-1997 period (including the pyramid schemes’ problem), the last two
reports put greater emphasis on relatively new topics for the country such as laws on
functioning of the government and ministries, independent institutions, the Parliament; public
administration reform, law enforcement bodies etc.76 Again, the main analysis on Albania’s
development of the legal framework in various areas was more focused on whether the
minimal conditions exist (for instance regarding media, human rights acts) rather than on
whether the legal framework had incorporated the European standards in line with the EU
acquis. Accordingly, the main expression used by the European Commission in all five
conditionality reports regarding the legal framework in various aspects was “the right of …..
is generally ensured / respected” and no reference was made to the level of compliance with
the acquis communautaire.77
On the Albanian side, the Strategy for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration
approved by the Council of Ministers in 199878 was  the  first  step  towards  a  structured
approach regarding the challenges of approximation of legislation with the EU acquis. It is the
first document that makes a clear and direct reference to the process and measures that would
facilitate the start of approximation. Such a step was also the establishment of a special body
under  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  a  department  on  approximation  of  legislation  with  EU acquis
communautaire. The Strategy defines European integration as a “multi-dimensional process”
which involves also the approximation of laws as a key prerequisite. One of the main
75 For former Yugoslav countries involved in the war, the Council conditions involved also other concerns
related to post-conflict matters such as implementation of Peace Agreements.
76 See the conditionality reports listed in section 3.3.2. or, for more information, the Commission’s website at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/sap_en.htm.
77 It is extremely difficult to identify reliable online references on the Albania-EU relations during the period
between 1992 and 1997. The research work focusing on this period is based mainly on the original
documentation provided online by the Archive of European Integration at the University of Pittsburgh, USA.
78 Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 752, dated 01/12/1998.
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directions for the overall  progress defined in this document involves the development of the
“necessary legislative parameters” and other specific tasks, such as legal amendments to the
existing legislation in order to align it with standards of the EU’s founding documents. While
referring to the period between 1992 and 1999, only a year after the adoption of this Strategy,
the European Commission concluded that “results in this field have been rather uneven and
clear priorities were never established within the relevant working party on approximation
and  reform  of  legislation”.  On  the  other  hand,  the  EC  underlined  the  need  of  a  more
systematic approach of governmental actions in this field and observed the newly established
department as a positive step in this regard.79
By the time the first  Stabilization and Association Report  was issued (2002) Albania
had a generally positive score only on the (basic) legal framework regulating the private
sector’s operations, on which account the main emphasis was put on implementation
aspects.80 Recommendations for further legislative improvements in most of areas of the SAP
reports were continuously put forward by the European Commission also in the subsequent
years. Yet, despite the shortcomings of the adoption of new legislation in specific areas and
adjustment of the existing ones, the EC reports were increasingly focusing on implementation
aspects.  The  2004  SAP  Report  concluded  that  with  regard  to  anti-corruption  measures  “the
problem in Albania is not the absence of strategies and legislation, but rather deficiencies in
their implementation and enforcement”.81 The same report observed that weak implementing
capacities undermine the country’s capacities to comply with SAA requirements.82
Almost  one  year  and  a  half  after  the  opening  of  the  SAA  negotiations,  a  European
Partnership  with  Albania  was  adopted  by  the  Council  outlining  the  short  and  medium-term
priorities of the Albanian SA process. This is perhaps the first document of the European
Union which makes clear reference to matters related to “approximation of Albanian
legislation with EU acquis and standards” and which outlines specific recommendations and
obligations for the country. The first European Partnership emphasizes that “where legislative
approximation is concerned, incorporation of the acquis into legislation is not in itself
79 European Commission, Commission Report on the Feasibility of Negotiating a Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with Albania. (Brussels: European Commission, COM 1999 599 final), 10.
80 Of course, the country was still far from having addressed minimum standards in the reports’ target fields. See
European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2002” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2002 163).
81 European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2004” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2004 203), 7. Same concerns have often been identified also
in other areas such as management of public finances, internal market and trade, various sectorial policies
(environment), justice and home affairs (money laundering, drugs, organized crime etc.).
82 European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2004” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2004 203), 20.
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sufficient; it will also be necessary to prepare to its full implementation”.83 It was clear that, in
attendance of the SAA negotiations’ conclusion, the country was entering in a more advanced
stage where requirements and indicators of success in the process would go beyond matters of
simply ensuring a basic legislative framework. The Albanian government responded
immediately with an Action Plan for the implementation of the European Partnership.84
Although this action plan did not undergo a formal approval by the Parliament, the
involvement of the institution during the drafting phase noted a positive step towards the
promotion of the Parliament’s impact on EU integration matters.85 Importance of the process
of approximation of Albanian legislation was further reinforced through the adoption of the
National Plan for the Approximation of Legislation (NPAL) which did not go through formal
approval by the Parliament either.86 The NPAL recalled the SAP’s achievements and outlined
the country’s objectives in the field of alignment with EU acquis based on the European
Partnership87, EC progress Reports, draft text of the SAA including the anticipated
requirements of the Interim Agreement. The structure of the NPAL was similar to that of the
European Partnership consisting of three parts: political, economic and European standards.
Differently from the European Partnership, the National Plan covered a 10 year period
through short (2005-2006), medium (2007-2008) and long term priorities (2009-2014). It was
expected that the NPAL would be updated in accordance with the findings of the subsequent
EC reports and the accompanying European Partnerships.
Yet, the only goal that the NPAL failed to fulfil despite the monitoring and reporting
instruments was the implementation of the short-term priorities (legal initiatives) within the
deadlines that it had defined in several fields. Even when the country succeeded to meet the
NPAL objectives related to the adoption of legal acts in line with EU acquis, lack of attention
on implementation and capacities to implement the new legislation prevented effectiveness of
this process.88 The slow pace of the approximation of legislation and its actual
implementation was also portrayed in the medium-term priorities for alignment with EU
83 See 2004/519/EC: Council Decision of 14 June 2004 On The Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained
in The European Partnership with Albania.
84 Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 634, dated 30/08/2004.
85 The parliamentary debate has usually followed the progress reports issued by the European Commission as
well, but these sessions have been mostly used for political accusations.
86 Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 317, dated 13/05/2005.
87 The NPAL did succeed in avoiding duplications with the Action Plan for the implementation of the European
Partnership by focusing only on approximation related aspects.
88 Similar remarks have been made by the EC in the 2005 and 2006 Progress Reports in several fields,
particularly those related to (implementation of) European Standards.
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acquis.89 The  setting  up  of  too  optimistic  deadlines  and  measures  in  the  process  of
approximation of legislation was in fact a phenomenon that was observed also in the previous
period.
Delays in the implementation of the NPAL objectives during the first  year were also
partly influenced by the parliamentary elections and the change of the ruling coalition – the
new government took office two months after the elections (September 2005). Furthermore,
following the last negotiations round on the SAA (end of 2005) it was clear that the
Agreement was close to signing and the government was preparing for a new “road map” for
the EU integration process and consequently, also for the process of approximation of
legislations with the EU acquis. Less than a month after the official signing of the SAA on the
12th June 2006, the Government adopted the National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA
(NPISAA).90 The new document repealed the previous decisions of the Council of Ministers
on the Action Plan for the implementation of the European Partnership and on the National
Plan for the Approximation of Legislation. The NPISAA’s measures related to approximation
of legislation will be analyzed in more detail in the subsequent section.
5.2. Current National Plans for Alignment with the Acquis Communautaire
Title  VI  (Approximation  of  Laws,  Law  Enforcement  and  Competition  Rules)  of  the  SAA
clearly defines Albania’s obligations regarding the alignment of its legislation with EU
standards and acquis. Article 70 of the SAA stipulates that this process will take place in two
consecutive  phases  of  the  transitional  period,  starting  with  the  fundamental  elements  of  the
internal market and related areas during the first five-year period. The SAA’s Article 70
reads:
1. The Parties recognize the importance of the approximation of Albania's existing legislation to that of
the Community and of its effective implementation. Albania shall endeavour to ensure that its existing
laws and future legislation shall be gradually made compatible with the Community acquis. Albania shall
ensure that existing and future legislation shall be properly implemented and enforced.
2. This approximation shall start on the date of signing of this Agreement, and shall gradually extend to all
the elements of the Community acquis referred to in this Agreement by the end of the transitional period
as defined in Article 6.
89 Gjergji Vurmo, Visa Policy of Albania (Western Balkans 2006), http://www.western-
balkans.info/upload/docs/1a_Albania_Visa_Policy_GjergjiVurmo.pdf.
90 Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 463, dated 05/07/2006.
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3. During the first stage as defined in Article 6, approximation shall focus on fundamental elements of the
Internal Market acquis as well as on other important areas such as competition, intellectual, industrial and
commercial property rights, public procurement, standards and certification, financial services, land and
maritime transport – with special emphasis on safety and environmental standards as well as social
aspects – company law, accounting, consumer protection, data protection, health and safety at work and
equal opportunities. During the second stage, Albania shall focus on the remaining parts of the acquis.
Approximation will be carried out on the basis of a programme to be agreed between the Commission of
the European Communities and Albania.
4. Albania shall also define, in agreement with the Commission of the European Communities, the
modalities for the monitoring of the implementation of approximation of legislation and law enforcement
actions to be taken.
According to Article 6 of the SAA, the transitional period is set to a maximum ten-year
period.  The  first  stage  shall  start  upon  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  Agreement.  In  the
fifth year after the date of entry into force of the Agreement, the Stabilization and Association
Council shall evaluate the progress made by Albania, and shall decide whether this progress
has been sufficient for the passage into the second stage in order to achieve full Association.
In  the  field  of  legal  approximation  and  law  enforcement,  the  aim  shall  be  for  Albania  to
concentrate in the first stage on the fundamental elements, with specific benchmarks, of the
acquis.91
As mentioned, Albania’s approximation process is currently taking place under the
National  Plan  for  the  Implementation  of  the  SAA  (NPISAA)  adopted  by  the  Council  of
Ministers.  The  Plan  is  largely  based  on  the  former  National  Plan  for  the  Approximation  of
Legislation and is structured in three parts – Political Criteria; Economic Criteria; and
Capacity to address EU membership obligations. With regard to the first two criteria, the
NPISAA focuses mainly on short (2006-2007) and medium-term (2008-2009) priorities, i.e.
legal initiatives and accompanying measures. The last part, capacity to address EU
membership obligations, involves long-term priorities (until 2012) as well and measures to be
undertaken by the government in addition to the short and medium-term priorities. This
strategic document focuses individually on all key areas and sub-chapters falling within the
three criteria which it aims to address by providing detailed information on:
? Political objectives
? Recent situation
- Legal framework
91 See Article 6 of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with Albania.
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- Institutional framework
- Technical assistance
? Priorities (short, medium and long term)
- Legal initiatives
- Implementing measures / activities
? Summary table on institutional capacities (investments / human resources /
infrastructure etc.)92
The NPISAA also remains open to updates in accordance with the new developments and the
priorities of the European Partnership and the EC reports. While from the structural point of
view and the approach to the approximation process, the NPISAA seems to reflect the current
trends of the EU integration process, concerns still remain on whether some deadlines in some
areas (movement of persons and services, free movement of capital, asylum, migration etc.)
are too optimistic. These concerns are particularly present when speaking about the
implementation of adjusted legislation within the deadlines as anticipated by NPISAA.93
Although there is no official data on the exact level of compliance with the short-term
objectives and measures set out in the NPISAA, progress on specific areas suggests that the
country is far from meeting these objectives within the deadlines of the National Plan.94 This
will  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  overall  progress  of  the  first  stage  of  approximation  process
(horizontal provisions contained in Title VI of the SAA), which would consequently be
reflected in the postponement of the second phase (related to vertical provisions –
Cooperation policies) of the transition period if the country fails to take appropriate measures.
From the institutional point of view, the process of approximation of legislation has
been considerably improved since the “concordance table” was introduced. This instrument
enables an additional filter (Ministry of European Integration) in the process of alignment of
legislation with the EU acquis. In compliance with the assigned duties, the Ministry of
European Integration is the first body that examines the compliance of the draft legislation
prepared by the line ministries and other institutions with the acquis communautaire.95
92This element is not present in all sub chapters of the NPISAA.
93 See European Commission, “Albania Progress Report 2007” Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels:
European Commission, SEC 2007 1429) and European Commission, EC Proposal for a Council Decision on the
principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Albania and repealing Decision
2006/54/EC (Brussels: European Commission COM 2007 656 final).
94 Experts argue that the country’s progress in attaining NPISAA’s short term objectives generally remains
within 30-35 percent of the measures. See below section 3.5.3.
95 Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 580, dated 10/9/2004. Point 2/e of this decision specifies that the
MEI examines compliance with EU legislation of draft legal acts put forward by the line ministries and other
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Despite the delays and sometimes even problematic draft legislation, this instrument has been
quite a helpful experience not only for the central institutions’ legal departments but also for
the Parliament and its respective bodies (legislative commission, EU integration commissions
etc.) which, as the last EC report concludes, lack the necessary capacities and expertise in this
field.96
While under the previous EU assistance program (CARDS) priority was given to
“stabilization” components related to capacity-building support and infrastructure, IPA will
increasingly focus on assisting the country to meet the objectives and obligations assumed
under the SAA – where aspects related to alignment with EU standards and acquis as well as
the effective implementation of new legislation remain central. Under the new assistance
programme, Albanian authorities will be more involved in the programming process related to
these  funds,  unlike  CARDS assistance  which  was  managed  through  a  centralized  system.  It
remains to be seen to what extent the country will manage to absorb and efficiently channel
EU assistance in order to address SAA obligations, including the approximation of legislation.
Despite the different focus, the CARDS programme has generally encouraged the
development of Albanian legislation in line with EU acquis.  However,  the  source  of  its
shortcomings was not only the lack of political consensus (tense political situation) from the
Albanian side, but also an inappropriate approach from the European Commission’s devolved
bodies.97 Such  an  example  was  the  draft  Law  on  State  Police  sponsored  by  the  EU  Police
Mission in Albania (PAMECA) which was strongly contested by Albanian think tanks in
December 2006. This network of Albanian think tanks organized a public round table with
experts who afterwards presented their arguments on behalf of the expert community against
the draft law in the Parliamentary Commission on Legal Issues. As a result, the draft law was
withdrawn for additional improvements. However, PAMECA experts and governmental
central institutions. These institutions must state in the explanatory memorandum the level of compliance and
respective legal references of acquis communautaire.
96 “The level of expertise available to the parliament, including on EU integration issues, remains low. This is
reflected in the quality of legislation.” See European Commission, “Albania Progress Report 2007” Commission
Staff Working Document (Brussels: European Commission, SEC 2007 1429), 6.
97 In fact, this has been one of the reasons why IPA employs a decentralized approach of its management. Similar
problematique was present also in Macedonia with regard to the performance of the European Agency for
Reconstruction (EAR). National experts had previously suggested a similar approach to that of the current IPA
programme. Delays and other shortcoming in the work of the EAR have been acknowledged also by EU Special
Representative in Macedonia Mr. Erwan Fouéré in an interview for the daily Dnevnik (see Devnik, “????
???????????????????????????????” [“There is no ill-management with foreign donations”]. Devnik, 6th October
2006, http://www.dnevnik.com.mk). On the other hand, cases of mismanagement from the EU side may well
have a negative impact on the general perception in SAP countries. Such cases have been largely debated earlier
in 2007 when EU officials were charged with corruption (see EU Observer, “EU corruption case sparks fresh
questions”. EU Observer,  5th April 2007 and EU Business, “EU official charged in corruption probe”. EU
Business, 20 June 2007).
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representatives did not fully reflect the remarks of Albanian think tanks in the second draft
which was adopted. The experience with the EU’s Police Assistance Missions has shown that
the EU has not been very careful in ensuring that each of these Missions respect the principle
of continuity in both, their work and their approach. While PAMECA I (2002-2004), in
accordance with its objectives, smoothly followed the pattern of the previous mission
(Multinational Advisory Police Element: 1997-2001) by furthering the achieved progress, the
second mission (PAMECA II), experts argue, has been less efficient in some regards.98
Needless to say,  the programming and implementation of the NPISAA is primarily a
responsibility of the Albanian stakeholders – the executive, legislative and judiciary branches
of power. However, close cooperation with independent actors (think tanks and experts) and
interest  groups  is  essential  for  framing  the  approximation  efforts  into  a  sound  process.  The
assistance of the European Union for this process (now under the IPA) will increasingly
support these efforts particularly with regard to the actual implementation of the aligned
legislation. In this course however, more space should be enabled for the local expertise of
independent think tanks which have already outstripped the “infantile” period and are now
exporting their know-how in the region and beyond.99 The recently established practice of
consultations between the political actors, interest groups and civil society representatives
should be further consolidated: involving third parties in these consultations which may be
quite sensitive for the political actors’ agenda; and strengthening communication and mutual
brainstorming processes between EU agencies providing expertise in the country’s
approximation process and local think tanks and independent experts. Such an approach has
been increasingly employed by political actors in the last 3-4 years and the experience shows
that legislative processes have been more effective when remarks and suggestions from such
public-private-civic consultations have been adequately reflected in the legal acts or other
strategic documents.
98 In addition to PAMECA’s failure to provide sound expertise for the Law on State Police and to cooperate with
Albanian think tanks on other police reform matters, Albanian experts note that PAMECA II has often shown
lack of continuity and commitment to push for certain reforms, regardless of political reactions. Another
“scandal” of PAMECA II has been recently published by the daily Panorama which’s investigative report shows
that  the  mission’s  2007  report  on  Albanian  State  Police  is  a  simply  “copy-paste”  work  of  a  Report  on  the
Bangladesh Police from 2006. The Panorama report further notes that in three years PAMECA II has only
criticized certain shortcomings of the police reform in Albania once (in June 2007, only a few months preceding
the conclusion of the mission). See Panorama, “Misioni PAMECA: Raporti për policinë u kopjua nga
Bangladeshi” (“PAMECA: The report on the police was copied from Bangladesh”), Panorama, 17th December
2007 and Panorama, “Interview with Artan Didi former Police Director of Public Order”, Panorama, 18th
December 2007.
99 A considerable number of Albanian think tanks have succeeded to build themselves as centres of excellence
and are involved in various international consortiums providing assistance and expertise on various fields in the
region (Kosovo, Macedonia) and also in other parts of the world.
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A similar experience of the influence of civil society and independent experts on a
governmental strategic document has been recently noted with the draft text of the National
Strategy for Development and Integration 2007-2013 (NSDI) which involved the medium and
long-term commitments of the government with regard to the EU and NATO integration, the
democratization process, consolidation of the rule of law, socio-economic development and
the accompanying measures to meet the objectives in these fields. At a series of public
consultations during October-November 2007 civil society representatives, private actors and
other stakeholders delivered serious remarks on several parts of the NSDI. As a response, the
government  withdrew  this  draft  for  further  improvements,  even  though  its  approval  was
supposed to take place by the end of the year 2007.100
The National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA  has already been updated a few
months ago in accordance with the new developments. Nevertheless, public institutions still
cannot efficiently respond to the deadlines outlined therein. It seems that the shortcomings are
not simply due to the too optimistic deadlines, though this still remains a concern. The
coordination structures which have been established between the Ministry of European
Integration and other line ministries proved to be only moderately efficient in the overall
performance of the EU integration process. It is therefore evident that there is need for further
improvements in this aspect. While the existing institutional setup in charge of EU integration
matters has been largely acknowledged as an efficient experience, additional adjustments are
needed especially now – following the new stage of this process with the Interim Agreement
in force and in view of the forthcoming challenges (eventual application for membership and
screening). The European Integration Units (EIUs) established in the line ministries cannot
efficiently coordinate the entire process, while they can be even less efficient with regard to
the approximation of legislation. Permanent working groups focusing on these matters and
performing in accordance with a set of guidelines and rules on approximation of legislation
may provide the necessary shift to speed up the process. To this end, the Ministry of European
Integration should be allowed to take a more active role with regard to monitoring and
“pressuring” the central institutions to meet the obligations they have assumed in the
framework of the integration process. Furthermore, an appropriate attitude should be
100 NSDI is a strategic document of the Albanian Government replacing the National Strategy for Economic and
Social Development (expired in 2005) which in addition involves also priorities (such as NATO and EU
integration) which were not reflected in the previous document. One of the main remarks that Albanian experts
addressed on the draft NSDI is that this document should not be a simple “copy-paste” work of the sectorial
strategies (on EU integration, economic development, anticorruption etc.). Rather, it should provide a more
comprehensive approach to the implementation of the outlined objectives and its adoption must undoubtedly
undergo parliamentary debate due and procedure.
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developed among central institutions with regard to an essential element of the alignment
process – i.e. the capacity to implement the enforced new / adjusted legislation and
standards.101
Nevertheless, these measures would not yield the expected results if the Parliament did
not adjust its performance to the pace of the alignment process. In this sense, it is of crucial
importance that Albania addresses the EC recommendation voiced in the 2007 Progress
Report  to  improve  the  capacities  and  expertise  for  Albanian  law-makers.  Last  but  not  least,
political consensus amongst Albanian parties for crucial reforms, legal improvements and
implementation of EU standards is a condition which needs to be further enhanced by
widening this consensus through permanent consultations with third actors. This is
particularly important now, as the recent EU enlargement debate suggests that “tangible
results” and not political commitment will be the core criteria for progress in the relations
with the EU.
5.3. Compliance with the EU Acquis
Various deadlines have been announced by Albanian political leaders and representatives,
especially during electoral campaigns, regarding the date for acquiring the candidate or
membership status. Nevertheless, they have not succeeded yet to convince the general public
and the opinion-makers on the seriousness of their  electoral  statements through presenting a
road map in an official (strategic) document with clear measures and deadlines for each of the
stages ahead in the European integration process.102 The political coalition currently in power
has been very careful in this regard and has not predicted in its program any deadlines (unlike
those voiced during the 2005 campaign).103 Consequently, it seems that despite the national
plans and strategies for EU integration (and thus approximation of legislation) there still exist
uncertainties in the political discourse about the timing and progress of this undertaking (but
not as regards the final result). The source of these uncertainties has to do not only with the
deepening EU enlargement debate in Brussels, but also with internal factors (progress on
economic, political and other essential reforms) conditioning the capacity to implement the
SAA obligations.
101 There are quite a number of legal acts which have been developed in compliance with EU standards, but
which Albanian institutions have failed to properly implement, due to lack of capacities or other factors that have
not been taken into consideration in the drafting phase.
102 While the NSDI mentions the “candidate status” as a strategic goal to be achieved, it does not provide a
timeframe within which this status should be achieved.
103 Government of Albania, Program of the Government 2005-2009 (Tirana: Government of Albania, 2005),
www.keshilliministrave.al.
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The level of approximation of legislation as well as the implementation of the aligned
legal acts remain essential for such plans, especially now that the country has signed the SAA.
Preparations for an eventual application for membership will have therefore to take into
account progress and tangible results in this field in order to avoid failures similar to those in
1996 and 1999 regarding an association agreement.104 The absence of such plans should not
however  be  linked  with  the  lack  of  progress  in  the  approximation  process  exclusively.  The
European Commission has acknowledged the overall good progress with regard to the
NPISAA, despite the shortcomings or the delays in this course. Yet, the current pace of
alignment with EU acquis is  not  satisfactory  for  a  successful  transition  to  a  more  advanced
stage.
The last EC reports note a steady progress in approximating Albanian horizontal
legislative framework to the acquis communautaire in several sub-areas of the “economic
criteria” – internal market and sectoral policies. However, serious deficiencies in this field
have been often linked also to lack of progress in other areas such as the judiciary reform
which still remains a central concern. A generally good progress has been acknowledged by
the EC 2007 Progress Report in the field of state aid which is essential for strengthening the
competitiveness of the Albanian economy.105 Similar progress was reported also with regard
to environment and labour legislation although further improvements for both areas’
legislative framework remain an essential need to be addressed. In addition, implementation
of the aligned legislation remains relatively modest due to lack of sound administrative
capacities.
The 2007 EC Progress Report maintains a relatively positive assessment of Albania’s
SA process as compared to the two progress reports before it (2005 and 2006). Although there
are no legal barriers disallowing an eventual application for EU membership at this stage,
progress in addressing SAA obligations and especially with regard to the NPISAA is not
sufficient. The draft text of the new European Partnership 2007 outlines a series of short and
medium-term priorities focusing on approximation aspects of the SA process in the fields of
competition, environment, customs, taxation and other sectoral policies. Furthermore, this
document underlines serious challenges which should be adequately addressed as regarding
the administrative and institutional capacities to enforce the new legislation in important areas
like employment, food safety, consumer protection, state aid, intellectual property law,
104 The country was denied an association partnership with the EU two times so far, in 1996 and 1999.
105 European Commission, “Albania Progress Report 2007” Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels:
European Commission, SEC 2007 1429), 30-31.
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financial control and other fields conditioning progress in the economic criteria.106 The
effective implementation of the NPISAA requires concerted efforts by all stakeholders
involved in both alignment of legislation and its actual implementation. This is essential in
order to create an acceptable record that may justify support to an advanced relationship with
the Union and thus, a “negotiation chapters-based approach” for future EC reports.107
6. EU Perspectives, Effects of Conditionality and Forecasts
Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004) distinguished two dimensions of EU’s
governance: a) internal dimension which concerns primarily the creation of rules as well as
their implementation in EU members’ political systems; and b) external dimension of
governance  which  is  exclusively  about  the  transfer  of  given  EU rules  and  their  adoption  by
non-member states. With regard to the latter dimension, the authors emphasize the importance
of conditionality which has been widely acknowledged as the most powerful instrument of
EU’s external dimension of governance.108 Conditionality as an institutional arrangement
represents a norm, a standard of behaviour which links a set of perceived benefits with the
fulfilment of certain conditions.109 Within this framework, a clear definition of the “supply”
(incentives) and “demand” (EU membership bid) side of a conditionality relationship is vital
for this instrument to instigate the expected impact in the governance / policy-making process
of a non-EU country. Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev (2003) argue that the absence of
a clear EU strategy with visible benefits for the Balkans runs counter to the main objectives of
EU conditionality.110 Many  scholars  share  the  opinion  that  the  current  settings  of  the  EU’s
conditionality vis–a-vis the Western Balkan countries is not producing the expected impact in
those countries, or at least not within the desired timeline. While further exploring these
concerns, they argue that the impact of EU conditionality depends also on the level of
106 See in particular the short term priorities of European Commission, EC Proposal for a Council Decision on
the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Albania and repealing
Decision 2006/54/EC (Brussels: European Commission COM 2007 656 final).
107 The NPISAA’s structure in fact has employed a similar approach. However, it should be understood that it is
actual progress and not the choice of the document’s structure that matters when it comes to preparations for an
advanced relationship with EU.
108 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”. Journal of European Public Policy 11 (2004): 669–687.
109 Karen Elizabeth Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How
effective?” EUI Working Papers, SPS No.97/7, 1997.
110 Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, “EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to
the Process”. South East European Studies Programme, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2007.
55
economic and political development and traditions conditioning the political commitment of a
certain (non-EU) country subject to this relationship.111
The subsequent part of the chapter will analyze precisely these aspects, i.e. to what
extent EU conditionality has impacted upon the Albanian political processes and what are the
future prospects in this context. To this aim, this section will analyze EU conditionality in the
Albanian integration process in terms of the requirements outlined by the EU and their
purpose and also in terms of the role of the actors involved in such a conditionality
relationship. In doing that, attention will be paid to the recent concerns of various scholars
with regards to clarifying both the “supply” and “demand” side of the conditionality
relationship in the Albanian case as well.
The section shares the position of many scholars arguing that the EU’s conditionality
in the pre-SAP period (1992-1999) lacked a substantial element in the side of incentives
offered by the EU to Albania (and other WB countries), i.e. a clear membership perspective.
This has weakened the impact that the EU could have had on the Albanian political and
economic development processes. As such, this part focuses more on the conditionality
relationship and on its impact under the SAP. Tthe following section will also provide a
description  of  the  settings  of  the  EU’s  conditionality  during  the  period  between  1992  and
1999 and its influence at both, national and regional level.
6.1. The EU’s Conditionality in the Pre-SAP Period 1992-1999
The preceding sections of this chapter offered an overview of Albania’s political relations
with EU and the key developments of the EU integration process. As previously mentioned,
the first contractual relationship with the EC, the 1992 Agreement, was essential for the
country to overcome the economic difficulties in the early stages of its transition as well as to
pave the way towards its final goal, that is, EU membership. Nevertheless, this Agreement at
the  time  met  only  half  of  the  expectations  as  it  made  no  clear  reference  to  a  commitment
(from EU side) for Albania’s EU membership. Instead, its preamble was referring only to the
objective of an association agreement in due course when conditions were met. As a
consequence, the 1992 Agreement lacked also a clear definition of the conditions to be met by
the country in terms of its EU membership prospects such as approximation of legislation or
111 In this sense, Anastasakis and Bechev suggest that in addition to a clear reference of accession as the final
goal, EU policy should pay due attention also to make the (accession) criteria more relevant to the needs of the
citizens in the region and to tune the regional and bilateral dimensions of its policy in order to tackle all negative
externalities of the current confusion.
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other specific requirements as in the case of the Europe Agreements. In this sense, the
relationship established between Albania and the EU did on no account answer the two core
questions  of  a  supposedly  “conditionality  relationship”:  1)  what  precisely  are  the
requirements?; and 2) what are the conditions actually for?
Therefore, it is almost impossible to speak about typical conditionality in the relations
with the EU in this period and this is much a consequence of the level of Albania’s economic
and political development or democratic traditions conditioning its political commitment.
Until the late 1990’s the European Union had made no clear commitment as regarding the
Western-Balkan region’s membership prospects. An explicit reference to the Copenhagen
criteria was never made by the EU in its framework of relations with the Western-Balkan
countries. This means that during this period an eventual conditionality approach would lack
the most essential element – the incentives, in other words,, the supply side of conditionality.
In such conditions, it is understandable that the EU’s influence on the Albanian
democratization processes has been fairly small and far from the intensity of recent years.112
Yet, it would be unrealistic to deny in full an increasing  impact of the Union on the Albanian
democratization process around the mid-1990’s (following the 1996 elections and during the
1997 collapse of the state). However, as a result of the lack of a clear “supply and demand”
agenda in Albania-EU relations Albanian authorities were left with only vaguely defined
agenda for “homework”. Thus EU membership remained only a matter of electoral
campaigns’ promises for politicians.
Starting from 1996, and as a consequence of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the EU
launched for the first time the conditionality approach in its relations with Western-Balkan
countries. A new regional approach was introduced which finally called for a more firm
involvement from European countries in order to stabilize the Balkans.113 Accordingly, on the
29th April 1997 the General Affairs Council adopted the conclusions on the application of
conditionality in the relations with these countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the
former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Macedonia and Albania. Yet, neither the
112 As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, until 1997 Albania had achieved little progress in the democratization
processes and the consolidation of a market economy. Lack of a substantial involvement and “pressure” from the
EU’s side during this period was certainly one of the reasons for this state of affairs in which the country and the
ruling political elite still could not identify the real incentives to walk on the road towards Europe. This has been
the case also with other Western Balkan Countries. In fact, many scholars note that the EU’s influence in
preventing the former Yugoslav crisis and wars was almost non-existent.
113 The regional approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe was launched on the 26th February 1996 by
the EU (Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 26 February 1996) which was followed up by a
Commission report (European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on common principles for future contractual relations with certain countries in South-Eastern
Europe [Brussels: European Commission COM 1996 476]).
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regional approach, nor its accompanying instruments at the early stages (i.e. conditionality
approach under and the General Affairs Council Conclusions of 29.04.1997) addressed the
gap on the “supply side” of an eventual conditionality relationship. The General Affairs
Council described the purpose of conditionality in the context of “developing a coherent EU
strategy for its relations with the countries in the region” and it outlined a comprehensive list
of obligations (economic and political requirements) to be addressed by these countries. But
Council made no reference to a clear EU membership perspective what would have been the
most attractive “carrot” for Western-Balkan countries . Instead, the EU referred at this point
only to the development of economic, trade and contractual relations with these countries (the
latter implied an association agreement) thus leaving quite an elusive situation with regard to
the region’s European future.114
From 1997 to 1999 the European Commission had issued four Conditionality Reports
on the compliance of Western-Balkan countries. Yet, it was obvious that the impact of the
Union on the overall political and economic developments in the region was not showing the
expected results,. The situation called for more firm and proactive involvement of the EU in
order to move towards a more stabilized state of affairs in the region that would allow more
space for the advancement of the political and socio-economic situation. However, the
settings  of  the  regional  approach  and  the  incentives  it  offered  to  the  region  did  not  reflect
these needs and the European Commission itself indirectly acknowledged this fact in 1999.115
As  a  consequence,  General  Affairs  Council  conclusions  (8th and 26th April and 27th May
1999) recognized the EU’s responsibility in addressing the immediate instability and for the
first time mentioned the perspective of EU membership on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty,
once the Copenhagen criteria have been met by these countries. This marks a historic turning
point in the EU’s relations with the Western-Balkan countries, while it consequently
completes the framework of a more efficient conditionality relationship.116 The Santa Maria
114 The incentives for WB countries to comply with the requirements of the General Affairs Council and the
recommendations of the Conditionality Reports during this period involved mainly EU financial assistance and
the preferential treatment in trade relations which would take place with the development of contractual
relations. See “Approche progressive” and “Canevas pour l'application des conditions aux différents niveaux de
relations et de coopération” parts of the General Affairs Council conclusions, 29th April 1997.
115 In this document the Commission underlined the lack of substantial political and economic development in
the region and calls for a new approach to peace and stability. See European Commission, Communication from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Stabilization and Association process for
countries of South-Eastern Europe (Brussels: European Commission COM 1999 235 final).
116 The Fifth Conditionality Report issued by the European Commission in February 2000 had basically the same
structure and approach as the previous reports, but refered to the EU Stabilization and Association process for
countries of South-Eastern Europe and the accompanying General Affairs Council Conclusions of the 21st-22nd
June 1999 (in addition to those of April 1997).
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de Feira European Council (19th and 20th June 2000) reaffirmed the Union’s decisiveness to
follow an open door policy vis- a-vis the Western-Balkans:
“The European Council confirms that its objective remains the fullest possible integration of the
countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe through the Stabilization
and Association process, political dialogue, liberalization of trade and cooperation in Justice and Home
Affairs. All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU membership. The Union will
support the Stabilization and Association process through technical and economic assistance.”117
The launch of the Stabilization and Association Process as the new approach towards the WB
countries was further reinforced at the Zagreb Summit (24th November 2000). EU leaders at
the  summit  explicitly  underlined  that  “prospect  of  accession  is  offered  on  the  basis  of  the
provision of the Treaty on European Union, respect for the criteria defined at the Copenhagen
European Council in June 1993 and the progress made in implementing the stabilization and
association agreements, in particular on regional cooperation”.118
6.2. EU’s Conditionality under the Stabilization and Association Process
The Stabilization and Association Process followed a commonsensical development of the
regional approach and the pace of the changing attitudes of the European Union towards the
Western-Balkan  countries.  Considering  the  modest  impact  of  the  EU’s  policy  towards  this
region until 1999, it was clear that this relationship had an urgent need for further
improvements. However, this was not simply a matter of increasing emphasis on the
“carrot’s” side of the EU-Western-Balkan relationship. The EU had to define more clearly the
obligations  and  the  conditions  to  be  met  by  WB countries,  as  well  as  the  framework  of  the
process through which this relationship would further evolve. Such conditions were aimed at
avoiding the discrepancies of the previous experience, namely the EU’s weak influence and
the WB countries’ lack of commitment. The SAP was an adequate response to all these
concerns and in the case of Albania its impact could be observed, despite the 1997 crisis and
the emergency period until the beginning of the new millennium.
EU conditionality at this stage was developed into a true “accession conditionality”
which meant that both actors (the EU and WB countries) had a clear picture on the final goal
117 European Council, Presidency Conclusions: Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000
(Brussels: European Council, 2000).
118 European Council, Final Declaration of Zagreb Summit, 24 November 2000 (Brussels: European Council,
2000).
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(membership), and the conditions to be met to reach that goal..119 The rules of the game were
set and the SAP countries became well aware of the incentives as well as the potential
sanctions (suspension of benefits in case they fail to comply). The conditions that SAP
countries have to meet were rooted in the general Copenhagen and Madrid criteria (Political,
economic, administrative capacity and acquis-related) and also on country-specific aspects
outlined under the regional approach in 1997. The latter, involved principally obligations
under the peace agreements following the Balkan wars. The SA process was therefore aimed
to assist WB countries to move towards EU membership through introducing values and
principles such as democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, protection of minorities,
regional cooperation and a market economy. The conclusion of a Stabilization and
Association Agreement establishing a formal association partnership with the EU remained
the focal point of this process which was assisted by continuous assistance to meet the
criteria.120
Albania entered the new process of rapprochement with the European Union at a time
when it was facing an urgent need for restoring security and public order, rule of law and the
authority of state institutions in its territory. Furthermore, political tensions were still a
“normal” feature of the stabilizing efforts even following the clamorous events of 1997-1999.
The country had finally approved its Constitution providing a sound basis for further legal
reforms and consolidation of democracy, institutions and economic development; yet, a
number of challenges to achieving minimum standards of a functioning democracy remained.
The role and influence of the EU at the outsets of the SA process was following an
increasingly intense stream which was conditioned by the post-1997 situation and the
country’s needs for development, while further reinforced by the prospects being offered
under the SA process. In this course, the EU appears to be largely perceived as the most
important strategic partner for the country, while Albania’s EU membership ambition started
to be backed with a more firm commitment and concrete measures by the political elite, both
the opposition and ruling coalitions.121 In fact, although disputes and clashes between, and
119 According to Heather Grabbe EU accession conditionality represents an evolving set of conditions for
membership which have been progressively expanded to cover a wide range of policy outputs, and imply a role
for the EU in policy-making of countries aspiring for EU membership. See Heather Grabbe, “A Partnership for
Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants”. European
University Institute, Florence: Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper 99/12, 1999.
120 The General Affairs Council Conclusions of the 21st-22nd June 1999 outline these conditions and the frames
of the SA process. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on the Stabilization and Association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe
(Brussels: European Commission COM 1999 235 final).
121 The first SA Report of the European Commission on Albania underlines this gap in the previous period. The
report notes that “the lack of a democratic culture, the absence of dialogue between different political tendencies
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sometimes even within various political forces in Albania have been a recurring elements of
political “interaction”, EU and also NATO integration have always represented the sole
agenda for which political parties have constantly achieved the necessary consensus. All five
Conditionality Reports issued by the European Commission on Albania in between 1997 and
2000 referred to an almost identical description for the political climate in the country:
“Political and parliamentary life in Albania remains dominated by extreme bipolarization and
confrontation between the political parties”. The only positive assessment in this period
involved governmental efforts to stabilize the Albanian economy and also the positive role of
the country with regard to regional cooperation. Such assessment remained the same also in
the Stabilization and Association Reports but now with a greater emphasis on other concerns
and problematic areas which have to do with the rule of law, consolidation of institutions,
administrative reform and corruption, economic development etc.
As the previous sections of this chapter underlined, the Stabilization and Association
Process hit the highest point as regards EU conditionality with Albania. The SAP as a
comprehensive framework that clearly identifies all essential elements of an efficient
conditionality relationship (such as actors, obligations, incentives and risks) notes the
beginning of an intensive effort committed to reforms which involves both the ruling elite and
the opposition. Although progress in achieving SAP requirements has at times been sporadic
and unsatisfactory, awareness and sensitivity among other (non-political) stakeholders has
improved the quality of this process.  The new era of greater and more tangible involvement
by the political  actors in the EU integration agenda had started a couple of years before the
launch of the SAP, i.e. under the regional approach. In the period between 1997 and 1999
Albania introduced some changes in the institutional setup in charge of EU integration matters
while it  also adopted the Strategy for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration,  which note a
rather structured approach towards the country’s strategic goal. Yet, the Albanian process of
European integration still could not accelerate due to the consequences of the 1997 crisis and
the situation in Kosovo, but also due to the lack of political consensus and continuous
boycotts. Furthermore, the post-communist development of state institutions and democratic
processes (1992-1997) did not leave behind any meaningful struggle for consolidation of the
democratic culture that would encourage the appearance of other societal stakeholders,
consolidate their input in the democratic processes and increase sensitivity about inclusive
and a limited understanding of the concept of national interest amongst political leaders have often prevented the
development and implementation of sound policies to address the many issues that Albania faces”. See European
Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2002” Commission Staff Working Document
(Brussels: European Commission, COM 2002 163.), 4.
61
policy making processes and respect for the rule of law. These are all extremely important
elements of a consolidated democracy and political culture that have a direct impact on the
quality of the democratization processes and hence, the European integration process.122
Consequently,  the EU integration process at  the outsets of the SA process could not show a
better picture as the main actors – the ruling political  coalition and the opposition – were in
constant disputes while there were almost no inputs from other institutions and civil
stakeholders. Considering the lack of a clear EU membership perspective and also the
challenges of the post-1997 situation, the regional approach and the impact of the EU with
regards to “Copenhagen criteria-related” matters of the Albanian democratization process
could not go beyond the limits of an influence that may be described as “progressing” but still
insufficient.
Such situation of Albanian political developments until 1999 may perhaps serve as the
best illustration for the argument of many scholars, that the impact of EU conditionality,
besides others, depends also on the level of economic and political development and traditions
conditioning the political commitment of a certain (non-EU) country subject to this
relationship. Seen from this perspective, Albania had not progressed considerable, thereby
leaving the impact of EU conditionality at unsatisfactory levels.
The changes of the institutional setup of governmental bodies in charge of the EU
integration process as well as the development of a more structured approach in this process
which took place between 1998 and 2000 represented a kind of response to the newly
launched SAP and the improved EU conditionality. Yet, although these measures noted a step
forward and were acknowledged also by EU, Albania’s European integration process was still
relatively immune to the impact of EU conditionality.123 Namely, until the publication of the
first SAP Report Albania had achieved little progress and almost every SAA area (where the
country would take on obligations under a future SAA) was characterized by a considerable
lack of implementing capacity. This fact, as emphasized in the EC’s 2002 Progress Report,
reinforces the conclusion of this chapter’s previous sections that even those efforts aiming to
enhance the institutional setup of bodies in charge of EU integration during this period have
often emerged to help appease internal political disputes (within the ruling party and
coalition) rather than to support the SAP as such. Nevertheless, despite the low level of
influence on the political processes, EU conditionality was increasingly pressuring political
122 All five Conditionality Reports until 2000 underline the lack of development of two of the most important
stakeholders for a democratic polity: the media and the civil society.
123 European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2002” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2002 163.), 6-7.
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actors by making use of both instruments – sticks and carrots.  The subsequent period in the
relations with Albania undoubtedly demonstrated such an approach from the EU’s side.
Despite the fact that the country had not achieved a sound record of results in the European
integration process and neither had it created a cooperative political climate, the European
Commission in its report on Albania’s readiness for SAA negotiations suggested the
following:
“(…) the Commission considers that Albania is not yet in the position to meet the obligations of a
Stabilization and Association Agreement. However, if the current pace of change is sustained and if
sufficient priority is given to strengthening administrative capacity during the negotiating and transition
periods, considerable improvements can be made in the areas highlighted in this report. The
Commission believes that the perspective of opening Stabilization and Association Agreement
negotiations is the best way of helping to maintain the momentum of recent political and economic
reform, and of encouraging Albania to continue its constructive and moderating influence in the region.
The Commission therefore considers it appropriate to proceed with a Stabilization and Association
Agreement with Albania, and it will in due course submit a recommendation for a Council decision to
open negotiations, which can, of course, only be concluded when all appropriate conditions have been
met….”124
The EU’s message to Albania was therefore instantly recognizable and it provided clear
incentives through giving an EU membership perspective through the SAA / SAP. Albania
however had to address many concerns in many issues, such as:125
? weak democratic system and state institutions;
? administrative capacities;
? law enforcement;
? judiciary;
? key areas of the SAA (free movement of goods, establishment, competition,
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights, public procurement and Justice
and Home Affairs-related issues etc.).
124 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council On the Work of the EU/Albania High
Level Steering Group, in Preparation for the Negotiation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with
Albania (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2001 0300 final) This report observes also the progress made
since the 1999 EC Feasibility Report on Albania.
125 See the “General Evaluation” part of European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council On
the Work of the EU/Albania High Level Steering Group, in Preparation for the Negotiation of a Stabilization
and Association Agreement with Albania (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2001 0300 final).
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The first EC Report on Albania’s SAP (2002) concludes that “short term interests of political
leaders had occasionally prevailed over the strategic vision of a continued rapprochement to
Europe.”126 A year after, the second SAP Report notes that these negotiations risk being long
and drawn out if the pace of reform implementation fails to accelerate. Political tensions and
instability ceased only shortly in 2002 (during the election of the President as discussed in
Chapter 1) while immediately after, lack of cooperation and also the feeble political
commitment continued to seriously jeopardize the implementation of the SA process. The
government’s attention was increasingly focused on internal political disputes which,
combined with the lack of a constructive role of the opposition, caused delays in the reform
processes. Serious concerns over the rule of law, organized crime and corruption,
administrative reform etc.  were underlined also in the third SAP Report  (2004).  Progress of
SAA negotiations through nine negotiation rounds were therefore meaningless because
Albania’s advancement in the SA process could not provide the necessary guarantees for
proper implementation of the SAA and especially the Interim Agreement. The active
involvement of other political  and civic stakeholders in this process – such as parliamentary
bodies, civil society etc. – influenced the opening of the European integration process, but still
failed to produce any tangible effects except the fact that EU integration was now an even
more important argument for mutual accusations between and within political coalitions and
parties.
The influence of EU conditionality on the Albanian reform processes and particularly
on the commitment of the ruling political coalition was during this period at quite low levels.
The government had achieved very little progress and was showing very vague commitment
to the implementation of the SA process. The EU’s pressure on Albanian politics was
increasing and it seemed that at that point the postponement of the conclusion of the SAA
negotiations simply was not enough. The country was clearly told by EU representatives on
several occasions that political declarations for commitment to the integration agenda must be
matched  with  meaningful  efforts  and  tangible  results.  Few days  after  the  publication  of  the
third Stabilization and Association Report on Albania, the EU Commissioner for External
Relations, Mr. Chris Patten, concluded that the country had achieved not nearly enough real
reform to bring about meaningful progress. Through quite a frank description of the situation
and by using a language which was characterised by diplomatic wording, Commissioner
126 European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2002” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2002 163), 21.
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Paten underlined that the country would not advance along the road towards Europe until it
did not tackle the pending key priorities of the European Partnership.127
The only  priority  of  the  European  Partnership  which  was  successfully  influenced  by
the EU over the next period – from March 2005 until November 2005 when the 4th SAP
report was issued – was the holding of the parliamentary elections (July 2005) and the smooth
transfer of power from the Socialist to the Democratic Party led coalition. While – to put it in
the  EC reports’  usual  wording  –  “very  modest  progress  was  achieved”  with  regard  to  other
SAP areas, the Parliamentary elections of July 2005 boosted Albania’s EU integration bid.
The EU Enlargement Commissioner,  Mr. Olli  Rehn on that  occasion said that  “Albania has
removed a critical barrier to the conclusion of negotiations on a Stabilization and Association
Agreement”.128 Considering the fact that the country until 2005 was continuously
“blacklisted” for lack of action on various negative phenomena (organized crime, corruption,
transit route and a source of trafficking in human beings and drug, unfavourable business
environment etc.), the internal civil society reaction and pressure on the government (and in
general, on the ruling coalition) to align itself with European integration mainstream
processes was a positive step towards the opening of the EU integration process and hence the
consolidation of civic actors’ role therein.
Naturally, the EU’s conditionality and the progress-oriented attitude in the relations
with Albania were also a key factor for the progress achieved in the parliamentary elections in
2005. This was coupled in addition with internal pressure by the opposition and more
importantly, by the general public and the civil society structures that made clear that this was
the last chance for Albania to change attitude and start addressing pressing concerns and thus
move forward in the integration process. The consequences of EU conditionality in addition
to other international bodies and independent national organizations’ reports on organized
crime, corruption, trafficking etc. was certainly one of the more important arguments which
was used by Albanian civil society to increase pressure for tangible progress and concrete
results. While lack of progress in key areas (identified by the European Commission as
problematic ones) represent a clear indicator of the failure of political actors’ commitment in
the reforming processes, the increased pressure by national stakeholders undoubtedly
demonstrated the impact of EU conditionality on the national overall developments and
political processes. The continuous use of EC progress reports by both, political and non-
127 Christopher Patten, On the third SAP Annual Report and European Partnership for Albania (Tirana:
Delegation of the European Commission), www.delalb.cec.eu.int/en/news/articles/march2004.htm.
128 Deutsche Welle, “Interview with Olli Rehn”, Deutsche Welle 12th July 2005, http://www.western-
balkans.info/htmls/page.php?category=355&id=780.
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political actors, as a comprehensive comparative scale measuring the performance and
success of governmental reforms, the parliament’s and other institutions’ role in the process,
shows that the conditionality instruments under the SAP are far more developed and efficient
than the previous period. Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to argue that tangible results
should come exclusively as a consequence of the impact of EU conditionality on political
actors and processes. In addition to political commitment by all political actors, this would
also require the existence of civic pressure and active attempts to influence decision-making
processes. The first two EC progress reports on Albania’s SA process (2002, 2003) have
continuously underlined the fact that “civil society remains underdeveloped and largely
ineffective” and only in 2004 some improvement in this regard was identified.129 The political
developments and progress during the period between 2002 and 2005 provide clear evidence
of the accuracy of such conclusions.
Such level of advancement in the role of civil society and other non-political actor’s
influence (business sector, media, interest groups etc.) on political processes and consequently
on the EU integration process continue to be one of the key factors for success, however
moderate. In fact, the signing of the SAA and the entry into force of the Interim Agreement
seems to have increased sensitivity of and involvement in EU integration affairs of the
aforementioned actors. Not only are Albanian civic and private actors attempting to actively
influence policy and decision making processes in the country, but they have often appeared
very determined to criticize and influence EU-originating processes as well.130 The novelties
in  this  regard  and  the  improved  role  of  civil  and  other  non-political  actors  in  the  policy-
making processes is being considered also by governmental representatives who have
developed consultations with them on various topics of interest of reforming processes in line
with  EU  conditionality  and  SAP  framework.  Yet,  although  this  may  note  a  good  starting
point, there is a lot of space for improvement by both governmental and non-political
stakeholders. Accordingly, the Albanian experience shows that not only the existence of a
clear conditionality relationship, but also the settings under which EU conditionality is used,
are essential for success and even more important for sustainability of the pace of progress.
129 See European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2002” Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2002 163), 5; European Commission, “Albania Stabilization
and Association Report 2003” Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM
2003 139), 4 and European Commission, “Albania Stabilization and Association Report 2004” Commission Staff
Working Document (Brussels: European Commission, COM 2004 203), 4.
130 In additon to the previously mentioned case with Albanian think tanks who opposed the PAMECA Mission
sponsored draft Law on State Police (December 2006), there are also other cases where the representatives of the
private sector have tried to influence various developments caused by the negotiation and implementation of the
Interim Agreement.
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The experience of Albania shows that not only the lack of a clear conditionality
relationship but also the use of conditionality in the absence of the involvement of non-
political stakeholders (civil society, media, business sector and other interest groups) in the
policy-making processes, may well prove inefficient in bringing about enhanced commitment
and tangible results in national reforms.131 In perspective, however, it can be claimed that both
the alignment with EU requirements as well as the involvement of societal actors’ in the
decision-amking processes is slowly but firmly developing  in the country. Yet, it seems that
Albanian political actor are still not adjusting adequately to this new trend. As previously
argued, there are currently some positive examples of changing attitudes in this respect too.
However, such developments are still of a sporadic nature. Without the the “stick and carrots”
of EU conditionality democratic consolidation and thus the integration process of the country
would not be strong enough to continue on its own. Consequently, a harmonized approach
between EU conditionality, non-political actors’ involvement and continuous real political
commitment may best serve the purposes of the EU integration process. Furthermore, such a
harmonized approach that takes into consideration role of these elements, would undoubtedly
ensure an upward and sustainable development of social, political and economic advancement
of Albanian society.
6.3. EU Accession Prospects
The debate on an approximate date (i.e. year) of Albania’s eventual EU accession has been
one of the most interesting topics of the public debate in the country. Differently from the
columnists of daily papers, Albanian experts of EU integration matters have persistently tried
to point out that in view of the proven record of the level of political commitment to reforms,
it is not the date but the progress to meet the requirements that matters the most. It is
understandable that the general public’s attention may be more easily attracted with the debate
on the date rather than on the complex concerns of reforms in specific areas. Yet this has been
a “favourable” circumstance for the politicians, not only during election campaigns but
particularly at times when they were in desperate need of shifting public attention away from
the severe  criticism regarding its failure to take forward reforms.132
131 This is also one of the reasons why the new Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance pays particular attention
to the strengthening of the role of civil society and other private stakeholders in WB countries.
132 Such shortcoming has been (mis)used by Albanian politics on several occasions. For instance, it has always
been easy for the ruling political coalitions to attract the people’s attention on the prospects for a visa free regime
with the EU (and the eventual date when that would become a reality) and thus minimize the effects of the
debate on the civil registry system (which is the core condition for free and fair elections).
67
Nevertheless, the debate on an approximate date for EU accession per se may not be
considered as irrelevant or useless for as long as this debate takes place under a
comprehensive framework of actions that outline a road map with clear indicators of success.
Unfortunately,  this  has  never  occurred  under  such  framework  in  the  past  15  years.  On  the
contrary, EU accession has always been an issue which has been announced by political
actors only in election campaigns as an instrument to attract voters. Considering their record
so far in the progress and commitment to the reforming process, the reasons for their
reluctance to firmly announce a deadline for accession and an objective action plan to attain
this goal become clear. The NPISAA follows the example of the previous strategic documents
in the field of EU integration and thus provides no details about this challenge. The first draft
of the National Strategy for Development and Integration also provides no details about such
plans.133 Although such attitude of the political actors and particularly of the ruling political
coalition has often been characterized as “justified cautiousness”, in fact it is simply an
attitude that displays insecurity, first and foremost about their readiness (rather than
capacities) to take forward the reforms and the advancement of the Albanian polity.
Given these circumstances any further analysis and forecast regarding the accession
date  would  involve  many  “if-s”.  Some  of  the  key  factors  from  a  national  perspective  that
should be considered in this regard involve:
? political consensus and functioning mechanisms that ensure involvement of key civic
and private stakeholders in policy making processes;
? substantial political commitment to carry out reforms in key problematic areas;
? efficient implementation of the Interim Agreement and better capacities to address
SAA obligations;
? achieving a satisfactory level of capacities in compliance with the membership
criteria.
The  previous  sections’  analysis  on  the  overall  progress  and  performance  of  Albania’s  EU
integration  process  between  1992  and  2007  call  attention  to  a  number  of  shortcomings  and
internal concerns that have influenced such a slow pace of this process. The aforementioned
factors certainly fall within the set of most acute conditions that political actors “tend” to
133 This document went through a consultation process with non-governmental actors at the end of 2007 and the
accession debate was one of the central issues. Nevertheless, high officials in the Ministry of European
Integration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the final version to be adopted in 2008 March by the
Government most probably will provide a target date for the membership application only, with no details about
an eventual target accession date.
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ignore or manipulate. Accordingly, the forecast on an approximate date for EU accession
largely  depends  precisely  on  these  elements  and  on  whether  the  political  elite  will  take  full
responsibility to address these gaps and lead the process in close consultation with other key
stakeholders in the country. The last two Reports of the European Commission on Albania’s
SA Process have been quite encouraging although shortcomings and moderate or lack of
progress in key areas still remain actual concerns. Moreover, political parties’ lack of
confidence to envisage and firmly follow an objective and attainable timetable of the various
stages in the EU integration process is still present, though to a lesser extent. While this may
well be a consequence of the perception based on the recent experience of other countries,134
the missing structured approach based on wide political consensus and commitment to
reforms in the country also indicates that such insecurity may also derive from internal
factors. At present, there is an additional factor which should be considered while analyzing
political actors’ lack of confidence for a determined accession plan: the bitter experience with
the SAA negotiations (which the Commission refused to conclude in the absence of tangible
results).
Obviously, none of these circumstances can justify the eventual delays in addressing
the factors described above. In order to overcome the prejudices regarding the final decision,
actual progress in key areas of the EU integration process remain essential. Further, eventual
plans for EU accession should be realistic and avoid wishful thinking. It is difficult to assess
or anticipate future behaviour of political actors and their skills to establish wide consensus
and cooperation among key national stakeholders in the process of EU integration.
Considering the fact that such skills and determination have occasionally appeared in the past
for  quite  short  periods  of  time,  the  Commission’s  generally  positive  assessment  of  the  SAP
progress in the last two reports does not appear to be a sufficient argument on which one can
decisively base a positive assumption.
Therefore, forecasts on the eventual accession date for Albania should involve both
scenarios – the optimist one which is attainable if the pace of reforms continues to accelerate
and a pessimist scenario, which unfortunately remains possible given the track record.
However, it is difficult to foresee the second scenario not only due to internal factors (i.e. to
what extent can lack of progress jeopardize the integration process), but especially because it
is difficult to assess how that would affect the EU’s attitude toward the country.135 Therefore,
134 For instance the Commission has not yet recommended the opening of accession negotiations with
Macedonia.
135 Note that the following scenario is based exclusively on the analysis of internal factors.
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the following part offers the settings of the first (optimistic) scenario for EU accession which
sees the following timetable as a fully attainable goal:
? Status of candidate country by 2010-2011. At  present,  there  is  no  debate  about
Albania’s application for membership. However, considering the fact that regular
parliamentary elections should take place in summer 2009 any eventual decision that
would offer the status of a candidate country may not be expected before 2010. This is
so because even if the application would be submitted by the end of 2008 (earliest date
given the circumstances), the process of answering the EC questionnaire is not
expected to conclude earlier than the end of 2009.136 The finalization of the process
related to the EC questionnaire cannot precede parliamentary elections not only due to
political reasons (related to election campaigns), but also due to the fact that the
training of the public administration to answer the questionnaire will certainly take
some time.137 The most realistic scenario for this stage would include the timetable in
table 3.8. The sole and most important condition for this timeline is to show concrete
results in addressing the short term priorities of the European Partnership 2007.
? Conclusion of accession negotiations by 2014-2015.  If  the  first  stage  of  this  process
takes place within the timetable in table 3.7, and also, if the decision for the candidate
status (shortly after) is followed by the opening of the negotiations, it would take at
least  3-4  years  to  conclude  the  accession  negotiations.  Again,  this  requires  not  only
sound administrative capacities, but also firm commitment and concrete results of
reforms (especially as regarding the Copenhagen criteria). Given the present capacities
and the weak track record of Albanian political factors this stage is most likely to be
concluded in late 2015.
? Full membership by 2016-2017. Full membership in any case cannot take place earlier
than 2016 as it is difficult to assume without doubt that the conclusion of membership
negotiations would correspond with the moment at which Albania would be ready to
fully assume the membership obligations. A transitory period of 1 or 2 years is
accordingly most likely to happen once the membership conditions are defined.
Table 3.8. Timetable for Achieving Member Candidate Country Status, Optimistic Scenario
136 Particularly due to the fact that the Parliamentary elections and the forming of the new government will take
few months and will distort the public administration’s attention.
137 Currently, there are no plans to implement such a training. Neither has a preliminary assessment of the
administrative capacities to be involved in this process been carried out (until February 2008).
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Stage / Action Approximate date
Preliminary assessment of the administrative
capacities and projections for the necessary
infrastructure to answer the EC questionnaire
(independent experts, translators, coordinative
bodies etc.)
By October 2008
Preparing the public administration for the EC
questionnaire and the necessary infrastructure
Not earlier than November 2008 (it
should take at least 4 months)
Application for membership Not before early 2009
Completion of the EC questionnaire
(including the additional questions)
End of 2009 - June 2010
Candidate country status Not before than late 2010
The second scenario would imply an accession date that may not take place earlier than 2017-
2020. Although many politicians have announced in election campaigns that the 2013 2015
timeframe is a realistic and attainable goal, under the current progress this would be wishful
thinking. Albanian political discourse on the accession date (during election times) seems to
ignore the importance of the process of building the capacities and the ability to efficiently
respond to membership obligations. Considering the complexity of the process of EU
integration and the accompanying challenges of sound implementation of irreversible reforms,
it  would certainly be a wrong approach to minimize the debate and the struggle only on the
eventual date of accession. While such approach would serve only short-term political
purposes, its consequences would be reflected, first and foremost in the overall development
of  the  country  and  with  that,  in  the  EU integration  prospects  as  well.  The  arguments  of  the
expert debate must therefore prevail in the national discourse and raise public awareness on
the fact that EU membership without capacities to respond to the obligations would harm
Albania the more than it would the EU.
7. Convergence to or Divergence from the EU Norms after Aceession
Adherence to democratic values and rule of law in Albania has been widely analyzed by
opinion-makers, the representatives of the political and non-political sectors or international
institutions reports and this debate still remains a hot topic. The country’s overall performance
in strengthening and consolidating its democratic system has gone through various periods of
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setbacks to progress . It is perhaps this experience and also the track record of a slow progress
that continuously reminds the public debate about the necessity to maintain its focus on this
issue. The setbacks and progress in the Albanian democratization process are best described
in the Freedom House Nations in Transit reports, according to which from 1999 to 2005 the
country was listed under the category of transitional government or hybrid regime while for
the past two years (2006-2007) its performance moved towards a Semi-consolidated
Democracy.138 See table 3.9.
Table 3.9. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores – Albania *
1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Electoral Process 4.25  4.00 3.75  3.75  3.75  3.75  3.50 4.00
Civil Society 4.00 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.00 3.00
Independent
Media
4.50 4.25 4.00 4.00 3.75 4.00 3.75 3.75
Governance ** 4.75 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 n/a n/a n/a
National
Democratic
Governance
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4.25 4.00 4.25
Local Democratic
Governance
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.25 2.75 2.75
Judicial
Framework and
Independence
5.00 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.25 4.00
Corruption 6.00 5.50 5.25 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.00
Democracy Score 4.75 4.42 4.25 4.17 4.13 4.04 3.79 3.82
* Based on the democracy score and its scale of 1 to 7, Freedom House has defined the following regime types:
Consolidated Democracy, with 1-2 score; Semi-consolidated Democracy with a 3 score; Transitional
Government or Hybrid Regime with a 4 score; Semi-consolidated Authoritarian Regime with a 5 score; and
Consolidated Authoritarian Regime with a 6-7 score.
** With the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic
governance and local democratic governance.
Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2007: Albania (Washington D.C.: Freedom House, 2007).
138 Freedom House Nations in Transit reports measure progress and setbacks in democratization in 29 countries
and territories from Central Europe to the Eurasian region of the Former Soviet Union. It builds its conclusions
and provides a so-called “democratic score” based on the assessment of progress in the following key areas for a
democratic society: electoral processes, civil society, independent media, governance / national democratic
governance, local governance (separately, from 2005), judicial framework and independence, and corruption.
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Table 3.9. shows that from 1999 there is an increasingly strengthened tendency to move
forward with democratization efforts, despite the slightly worsened score attached to 2007
developments. While the Sisyphus legend mentioned in the introduction of this chapter in this
case may hold true for the developments within most of the monitored areas individually, this
reference is even more accurate in relation with the pre-1999 developments, when such
setbacks culminated in the 1997 crisis.139 The overall democracy score of the most recent
assessment  of  Nations  in  Transit  Report  on  Albania  (2007),  as  well  as  the  sporadic  upward
pace within specific areas individually do not give enough arguments to reason without
doubts that the upward direction would maintain its course in the overall assessment and also
in the developments of the key areas individually. Nevertheless, considering the stage in
which the EU integration process has entered (Interim Agreement in force, and soon with a
ratified SAA) and the consolidation of the role of civil society, media and also private sector,
the  set  of  tools  that  most  likely  will  not  allow  major  setbacks  (comparable  to  the  pre-1999
period) actually involves not only the EU conditionality but also a growing capacity of
internal pressure on governmental actions (in case they fail to comply with democratic
principles).
Analyzing the future prospects for convergence to or divergence from EU-norms after
the eventual accession from the perspective of democratic norms, it should be noted that the
gravest concern does not lie within the lack of a sound legal framework that regulates key
areas (human rights,  political  rights,  economy etc).  Rather,  it  is  the weak implementation of
and compliance with the legislation in force. This is a result of a lack of administrative
capacities or a lack of political commitment. In addition to these factors, such situation has
sometimes been a consequence of weaknesses and gaps in the capacities related to:
? drafting comprehensive legislative acts and bylaws;
? assessing the requirements for implementation of specific legislation;
? outlining a thorough framework of implementing actions which would involve not
only administrative capacities, but also specific measures on financial, technical,
infrastructural and other actions which would be deemed necessary for the
implementation.
The EU integration perspective has put forward (more intensely at  this stage) the need for a
concerted effort that state institutions and political actors have to carry out. Not only the
139 Only developments in the area of civil society and local governance have had an upward progress.
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approximation of Albanian legislation per se, but especially its actual implementation pose
immense challenges for both public administration and institutions involved in the legislative
and decision-making processes. The pre-accession period should be therefore maximally used
not only to build such capacities, but also to provide concrete evidence of the country’s ability
to  respond  to  the  EU membership  requirements:  stability  of  institutions,  functioning  market
economy, administrative capacity, and ability to assume membership obligations.
The concerns described above over the general democratization process and especially
with regard to the rule of law principle have been continuously underlined by the European
Commission. Despite the continuous improvements in the country, the SA progress reports
still underline a number of shortcomings in specific areas related to legal gaps and/or blurred
implementation performance. In addition, a lack of political commitment to fully enforce the
rule of law principles has also been identified as a major concern by the SA reports in the
past. A general understanding is being increasingly strengthened among political
representatives about the gravity of consequences that an eventual disregard of democratic
values and principles may result in. Furthermore, the active role of non-political stakeholders
– media, civil society, interest groups, private sector etc. – has been essential in drawing
attention of the general public as well as politics to this issue in the past few years. While EU
conditionality will continue to play an important role in the consolidation of an accountable,
transparent, responsible, democratic and citizen-oriented system of governance in the country,
the reinforcement of the position of non-state civic actors remains an undisputable imperative.
This could contribute to increased pressure on political actors in order for them to maintain
and further enhance the respect for democratic principles.
Considering the progress in the integration process, any major backward development
comparable to the 1992-1997 period, seems to be quite an improbable event. Yet, this does
not deny the possibility that the accession process could still potentially slow down in the
future. A key element in avoiding this is continuous positive pressure by the civil society on
politics. What is needed for this is that third parties react more actively to political processes,
rather than simply hoping that EU conditionality would provide the appropriate ‘sticks’ for
influencing political developments in a positive way.
The debate on growing convergence or divergence after accession is most probably
going to centre on the first part of the question (convergence) rather than the second.140 The
140 A satisfactory level of respect for democratic values may not pose a dilemma after accession, though such an
event always remains a possibility. However, any doubt about this issue will prevent Albania’s accession while
any circumstance leading to such a conclusion after accession will certainly activate the EU’s suspension
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main concern may well be the level of convergence and the quality of capacities to further
consolidate compliance with EU norms. Therefore, greater attention on the pre-accession
process  itself  (and  less  emphasis  on  the  accession  date)  would  not  only  enable  the  EU  to
process an “easy to digest  enlargement” with Albania,  but more importantly,  it  would equip
the country with efficient capacities to benefit from EU membership. The experience of
Albanian political actors with EU institutions has built a level of awareness and understanding
that any progress towards more advanced stages (associate/candidate/member country status)
in the EU integration process is conditional on reforms and tangible results.
Even though this lesson seems to be clear to Albanian political representatives, the fact
that they occasionally tend to waste more energies on speculations about the EU accession
date rather than to set  themselves sharp deadlines for the reforming process shows that they
have learnt only half of the lesson. Concrete results and tangible progress in Albania’s EU
integration  process  is  still  being  perceived  like  a  simple  evidence  to  be  demonstrated  to  the
EU ,  who ‘in return’ award benefits  – visa facilitation or liberalization,  candidate status and
new financial assistance programmes and so forth. In other words, convergence to or
divergence from EU norms is still being perceived simply as a matter of conditionality.
The entry into force of the Interim Agreement served as first feedback about how
detrimental the approach of not taking into consideration the local context by the government
is . For instance, business sector representatives appeared to be quite surprised and rather
unprepared  to  face  the  fact  that  in  five  years  time  they  would  have  to  deal  with  EU market
competition. Although representatives of some economic sectors were actively consulted by
the Albanian negotiating team, the general reaction of the business community displayed
feelings of concern and apprehension.141 The  business  reactions,  as  well  as  their  recently
increased sensitivity towards questions of EU approximation provide perhaps one of the best
examples of why third parties need to be consulted. Representatives of business are being
increasingly involved in this process and they exert increased pressure on the government or
show support accordint to their particular interests.142 Civil society representatives and the
mechanisms (as was the case of the suspension of bilateral political ties between Austria and the EU, following
the electoral success of Jörg Haider in 2000).
141 In their reactions, some business representatives even asked from the Government to re-negotiate some parts
of the SAA protocols (which are integral part of the Interim Agreement).
142 Another concern recently raised by the Albanian business community involves the debate on a visa free
regime with the EU. While opposing most of the Albanians’ wish and also the government’s efforts,
KONFINDUSTRIA representatives have asked for a more prudent approach to this issue which should be
accompanied with active measures to enhance higher education in accordance with the needs of the Albanian
economy. According to Mr. Gjergj Buxhuku, Albanian industrialists are currently faced with the lack of
qualified and skilled workers and they fear that a visa free regime might encourage the brain drain phenomenon.
Without any prejudice to the accurateness of KONFINDUSTRIA arguments, their intense involvement in the EU
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expert community have continuously tried to point out that that convergence towards EU
norms is primarily a matter of development and consolidation of democratic reforms. Yet it
was the business community that first provided practical evidence on the importance of this
argument. Their concerns underlined that convergence or divergence should not be treated as
a matter of conditionality that would pose the question of “what would the EU’s reaction be if
we comply with these norms or fail to do that”. On the contrary, a more pragmatic “cost and
benefit” oriented approach to this issue would pose the following question: What capacities
do we have to develop in order to best respond to EU membership and thus make full use of
the benefits of such status?
The latest developments in the EU integration process show that such attitude is
slowly gaining ground among Albanian public and private stakeholders. Yet, contrary to the
case of economic actors – whose motivation is  quite strong and directly related to concerns
over their performance and success in an open market – the behaviour of political actors still
displays certain gaps in this regard. This does not imply that political actors are not aware of
the necessity of this kind of understanding and approach to EU integration. But their
performance shows that they are still more concerned about EU accession dates and that
political commitment does not exceed statements and declarations.143 Accordingly, third
parties’ involvement will most probably offer the key remedy which will force political actors
to leave declaratory political commitments behind and provide concrete evidence in the
process of alignment with EU norms. Such pressure on and change in political behaviour
however must take place and be further reinforced during the pre-accession period in order to
allow the new attitude of political actors to perform efficiently and with sound capacities after
accession.
In its history of over half a century, the European Union has often been faced with
various  situations  where  member  states  have  failed  to  comply  with  EU  legislation.
Nevertheless, the foundations and basic principles of democratic societies have never
experienced failure in these countries and this is a consequence of a number of factors that
integration / enlargement debate shows the first indicators of a process which is increasingly becoming more
inclusive and de-monopolized.
143 Furthermore, their statements often confront any pragmatic approach which should guide the integration
process, thus reinforcing the perception that this struggle is simply a matter of paying “any price”. A similar
statement has been recently articulated by the Albanian Prime Minister at the Annual Assembly of the Atlantic
Treaty Association (Ottawa, Canada, October 31- November 2, 2007): “I’m taking this opportunity to assure you
that Albania, and all Albanian state institutions are fully committed to take every measure, adopt every
legislation, pay any price necessary for the success required, in order to deserve membership in NATO as the
best and most secure future for their country.” (The Prime Minister’s speech is available at http://www.atlantic-
council.ca/berishaspeech.html).
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have conditioned the establishment of the Union and have further strengthened the importance
of the shared values it promotes and protects. Contributing to the formation of stable and
prosperous democracies in the former-communist countries has been identified as an essential
task for the European Union. Their European integration process however would not be a
success story if they would see the EU as the sole remedy to their socio-economic or political
problems. While the EU may serve as an example, democratization and adherence to
democratic values remains a process to be carried out from within, for the sake of the country
itself. In view of these countries’ EU membership ambition, the pre-accession process should
be fully utilized to provide concrete results in this regard. It is only after this moment that EU
accession of a certain country can take place; and it is only after a successful process of
alignment  with  EU standards  that  a  certain  country  can  efficiently  “absorb”  and  address  its
membership obligations. In this way only, divergence from EU norms after accession would
be limited only to intermittent cases which provide the “raison d'être” of institutions such as
European Court of Justice, European Commission etc. This has been the core philosophy that
guided  the  2004  enlargement  through  a  smooth  adjustment  process  and  as  such,  it  will
certainly continue to streamline the recent enlargement efforts in Albania and other Western-
Balkan countries.
Appendix Table
Appendix Table 3.1. Key Events in Albania-EU relations
1992 Trade and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Albania.
Albania becomes eligible for funding under the EU’s Phare programme.
1997 Regional approach. The EU Council of Ministers establishes political
and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations
with countries in the Western Balkans
1999 The EU proposes the new Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)
for five countries of South-Eastern Europe, including Albania.
1999 Albania benefits from Autonomous Trade Preferences with the EU.
2000 Extension of duty-free access to EU market for products from Albania.
2000 June Feira European Council states that all the SAP countries are “potential
candidates” for EU membership.
2000 At the Zagreb Summit the SAP is officially endorsed by the EU and the
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November Western Balkan countries (including Albania).
2001 First year of the CARDS programme specifically designed for the SAP
countries
2001 The Commission recommends the undertaking of negotiations on a
SAA with Albania. The Göteborg European Council invites the
Commission to present draft negotiating directives for the negotiation
of a SAA.
2002
October
Negotiating Directives for the negotiation of a SAA with Albania are
adopted.
2003
January
Commission President Prodi officially launches the negotiations for a
SAA between the EU and Albania.
2003 June At the Thessaloniki Summit the SAP is confirmed as the EU policy for
the Western Balkans. The EU perspective for these countries is
confirmed.
2004 June Council decision on a first European Partnership for Albania
2006
January
Council decision on the principles of a revised European Partnership for
Albania
2006 May Entry into force of the EC-Albania readmission agreement
2006 June Albania signs the SAA at the General Affairs and External Relations
Council in Luxembourg
2006
December
Entry into force of the Interim Agreement
2007
January
Entry into force of the new instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
(IPA).
2007 May Adoption of the Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD)
2007-2009 for Albania under the IPA
2007
September
Signature of a visa facilitation agreement between Albania and the EU.
Source: European Commission, DG Enlargement http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/albania/key_events_en.htm.
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